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Abstract
Taking as a starting point the framework that the Northern Ireland Troubles were largely fought
on confessional sectarian, ethno-national grounds, this essay will analyze the internal and
external forces that incited Ulster Protestant political responses from the premiership of Terence
O’Neill, beginning in 1963, to the 1985 signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Through an
extrapolation of socioeconomic class dynamics, and geographical imperatives informed by such
source material as population demographics, election results, distribution of political violence, as
well as numerous Protestant organizational publications, it is clear that throughout the early
Troubles Protestant Northern Ireland increasingly undertook strategies of various modes of
political extremism in order maintain their provincial autonomy. Under the constant pressures of
drastically reoriented institutional circumstances disputes between elite Protestant politicians,
their constituent bodies, and grassroots working class paramilitary bodies emerged as the single
largest ideological cleavage that defined the trajectory of Ulster Protestant political action.
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Introduction
In mid-August 1969 a nearly thirty year period dominated by political and civil upheaval
known as the Troubles was officially triggered in Northern Ireland. At the time rioting had
spread to many areas of the province, though the worst street violence occurred in the province’s
largest cities—Londonderry and the capital city of Belfast. From August 12 to 15, a microcosm
of the violent extremes experienced in the early days of the Troubles occurred in West Belfast
between the predominately Catholic West Falls and the Protestant Shankill Road, where
sectarian rioting resulted in a massive damage to property. Particularly affected was Bombay
Street, the northern most street of the West Falls that borders the Shankill. In all, some forty-four
houses were burned out by Protestant mobs, but many more houses on both sides of the sectarian
divide were destroyed, and thousands of people displaced. 1 A thick concrete and high fenced
wall known as a “peace line” now separates the two communities, but in August 1969 this line
existed as a symbolic front line between the shifting political balance of the traditionally opposed
Catholic and Protestant communities of Northern Ireland.
Throughout the premiership of Captain Terence O’Neill, beginning in 1963, Protestant
constituents increasingly questioned the direction of traditional Unionism—the guiding force of
Northern Ireland’s Protestant political ideology. Why did Unionism so drastically fragment
throughout the 1960’s, and how did Protestants, lacking a unified political direction, attempt to
reconstruct their ideological places within Northern Ireland’s political conflict? The key to
answering these questions lay in the identification and analysis of the internal and external forces
influencing the various segments of the Protestant population within specific historical contexts.
Much of the existing scholarship endeavors to unravel the complex notions that inform the
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character of Northern Protestants by seeking to categorize Protestant beliefs and practices in such
a way that identifies broad spectrums of characteristics that simultaneously engender and exclude
certain segments of the Protestant population. Most prominently, commentators have tended to
build interpretations that are focused on the concepts of ethno-national identity and
socioeconomic class and how those two forces interact to form the basis of political action in a
society that is largely defined in sectarian terms.
Jennifer Todd’s 1987 article, “Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture,” is a
foundational work in the analysis of the major ideological strains in Protestant Northern Ireland.
Her two categories are the Ulster loyalist and Ulster British. The “more numerous,” and indeed
the ideological identifier most equitable with Protestant politics throughout this study is that of
the Ulster loyalist, whom if perceiving any challenge to their local hegemony by either the
Catholic other or a mainland United Kingdom government, to whom they professed a
“conditional loyalty,” would not begrudge themselves the right to an non-negotiable, extreme,
often times violent response. 2 Somewhat oppositely, the Ulster British have tended to be muted
throughout the early Troubles (a term that will be used throughout this work in reference to the
period from 1963–1985). According to Colin Coulter, the lack of political will and general
“contentedness” on behalf of the largely middle class Ulster British was derived from their
integration within the institutions of the United Kingdom, primarily through educational and
economic opportunities, which after the introduction of Direct Rule in 1972 provided them with
unprecedented levels of material affluence. 3 Todd’s descriptive categories and Coulter’s
economic underpinning of such ideological categories have however been disputed.
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James Loughlin’s Ulster Unionism and British National Identity Since 1885 explicitly
challenges Todd’s categorizations, claiming that even the more extreme, or loyalist, elements of
Ulster society have as their primary national identifier the British mainland. Loughlin claims that
in the 1980s, “the distinction described by Jennifer Todd… can be difficult to maintain in a
political context,” further claiming “British compromise/Ulster fundamentalism—is an
underlying homogeneity based on a deeply embedded Protestant faith and fear of the Catholic
Church.” 4 Though a merited observation, Loughlin is essentially pointing out a flaw in Todd’s
theory that she points to at the outset of her work. She states, “Northern Protestants… have a foot
in each camp and share aspects of each ideology.” 5 This simple defense aside, what is important
about Loughlin’s analysis is that he is only concerned with abstract notions of national identity
that are disconnected from material responses. Class is also largely ignored throughout his study,
but as Todd and Coulter have pointed out, class distinctions cannot be ignored within the context
of Ulster Protestant ideology.
Carrying on Todd’s schemata, Steve Bruce’s The Edge of the Union presents two
opposing forces within loyalism that at times share an odd, yet strained symbiosis and unity of
goals. The categories, in his words, are the “gunmen” and the “evangelicals.” In Bruce’s
interpretation, the gunmen are urban working-class Protestants who are often affiliated to some
degree with paramilitaries. On the other end of the spectrum are the evangelical Christians,
primarily rural working or middle class Protestants. Bruce also states early on that although his
work represents the extremes of Protestant political ideology, moderate Unionists too have
adopted elements of Protestant loyalism, especially when feelings of alienation toward their
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British allegiances became more acute. 6 These two categories found material expression through
paramilitary organizations and political parties, such as the Ulster Defence Association and
Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Democratic Unionist Party. One question that is consistently
raised by many commentators is how did such public figures and organizations construct viable
alternatives to traditional forms of Unionist politics considering their extreme nature?
The voice of Steve Bruce is again echoed in discussions on Ian Paisley. His 1986 work,
God Save Ulster!, was fully committed to understanding the influence and impact of Ian Paisley,
the founder of the DUP and also the Free Presbyterian Church, which broke from the larger
Presbyterian church in 1951. In more abstract terms, Bruce concludes that Paisley was not a
charismatic leader in the Weberian sense. Oppositely in fact, Paisley was very traditional; he
tapped into a belief system that was already prevalent in Northern Ireland and became one of its
main public purveyors and organizers. Bruce further claims that if Paisley stepped outside the
bounds of the value system he gave voice to his constituents may abandon him. 7 In other words,
Paisley was able to weave a sphere of influence that identified with existing political attitudes,
and therefore, his expressions could be ideologically incorporated into many segments of the
loyalist community. James McAuley’s micro-study of East Belfast, The Politics of Identity,
further exhibits the appeal of Paisley’s DUP, asserting that its success was largely due to their
visible willingness to politically interact with working class communities. This was seen in
opposition to the Official Unionists who would focus their campaigning on the “more suburban
outer wards.” 8
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Historian Graham Walker’s A History of the Ulster Unionist Party posits an
understanding of Paisley that differs from Bruce and McAuley because his study adopts a view
that the Official or Ulster Unionists could have been the saving force of Protestant politics if only
cooler heads prevailed throughout the Troubles. This becomes especially clear in his discussion
on 1985s Anglo-Irish Agreement: a piece of legislation that galvanized Protestant action, causing
“the calming influence” of Official Unionist leader James Molyneaux to join forces with
“political gunslinger” Ian Paisley to combat the implementation of the Agreement, which put
forward that the Republic of Ireland would have a say in specific matters pertaining to the
governance of Northern Ireland. Though all segments of Protestant Unionism indeed unified in
protest against the Agreement, from the above language it becomes clear that Walker favors
traditional Unionist politics over what he conceives as the more chaotic grassroots efforts of the
Paisley and the DUP. 9 Likewise, other works concerned with tracing the divisions within
Protestant politics have tended to place Ulster and Official Unionists in the role of the
protagonists in Protestant Northern Ireland politics. Moreover, the works of historians like
Walker 10 have a common shortcoming. Though dealing most thoroughly with the general
question of Protestant political division and claiming to represent analyses that are inclusive of
populist and grassroots political assertions, such works offer little critical consideration outside
of the official channels of parliamentary politics.
In outlining some strategies of loyalist paramilitary politics, the topic almost entirely
ignored by Walker and company, it has been concluded that due to its largely urban, working
class character paramilitary politics lacked widespread support outside of proximate paramilitary
9
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circles. 11 More optimistically however, Sarah Nelson credits the growing class-consciousness
experienced in Protestant areas of Belfast throughout the Troubles, as well as the paramilitaries’
will to organize community support groups to varying but nonetheless successful degrees. 12
Loyalist assertions relating to political place within Northern Ireland weigh heavily on the effects
of working class political developments.
The concept of political assertiveness and nation has led many commentators to adopt the
idea that the Troubles, despite being framed as a sort of religious war, was an ethnic conflict.
Religion, however, extends the conflict by supplying participants with a vocabulary in which to
view the social differences between themselves and the perceived other. However, the social
realities of the differences between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland have spread
beyond the historical bounds of purely confessional identifiers to become embedded in nearly all
aspects of Northern Ireland social and cultural life, including education, economics, and political
goals and limits. In short, “it is an ethnic conflict with a religious dimension.” 13 Furthermore,
political goals became directly linked with the aspirations of Catholic republicans and
nationalists as well as Protestant loyalists and unionists throughout the Troubles, namely through
the formation of separate and competing concepts of nation. In this way Alan Finlayson’s
argument is especially relevant. He posits that loyalism is fundamentally a nationalistic
ideological construction that focuses its significant place within the geographic state of Northern
Ireland. Furthermore, that state is the embodiment of a specified Ulster Protestant people that are
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separate from both their southern Irish and mainland UK counterparts. 14 Their nationalism is
compounded by a sense of constant, anxious embattlement due to their geographic and historical
place within the British Isles; they rely on a distant and seemingly indifferent UK benefactor to
guarantee a geographical place of power on the island of Ireland—where they are a clear
minority—since their Ascendancy following the Glorious Revolution in the seventeenth century
(two historical moments that have become mythic in present day Protestant culture through such
institutions as the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry annual commemorations 15).
In short, Ulster loyalist discourse resembles a simultaneous claim to an uneasy yet historically
legitimated hegemony in Northern Ireland and a pervasive fear of being overrun and victimized
by its southern neighbor. 16 Thus, the primary goal of Protestant politics, as an ethnic identity
informed by religious as well as nationalist concepts is further illuminated when Paul Bew, et al.
write, “The autonomy of the local state” was the paramount goal of Protestant politics
throughout the Troubles, as it “was designed to preclude a united Ireland and reduce dependence
on an unreliable ally.” 17 Considering these concluding remarks of the above presented
historiographical debate, it will be my general contention throughout this essay that that the early
Troubles fostered a near total acceptance of loyalist ideology among the Ulster Protestant ethnic
14
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bloc: an ideology primarily characterized by the acceptance of political extremism in defense of
the symbolic and legitimate authority of the Northern Ireland state, which was further shaped by
specific regional and social considerations.
Extremism, as briefly mentioned, was an important characteristic of Protestant loyalist
ideology. However, it was far from a singular method for political articulation and action. In fact,
extremism had many degrees of community support and modes of expression, ranging from
sectarian murder to much more peaceful forms of political protest, such as marching, or the mere
act of voting for loyalist candidates. Likewise, such strategies were subjected to varying degrees
of acceptance throughout the early period of the Troubles. Violence is an immeasurably
important issue when trying to understand the nature of Protestant politics throughout the
Troubles. One’s personal experience with violence was crucial when considering the
development of a protectionist ideology such as loyalism.
At its most immediate, the widespread violence of the Troubles caused many Protestants,
and Catholics alike, to fear for their most materially proximate need, their bodily safety. On a
macro level, the widespread violence of the Irish Republican Army and later Protestant
paramilitaries threatened to bring the state of Northern Ireland to an end. Violence was thus a
force that was deeply intertwined with the commonly expressed features of Ulster loyalist
ideology—the legitimacy of the state and its direct impact on local autonomy. The ramifications
of the anxieties brought about by the threat to one’s life and institutional conventions were wideranging and incredibly dynamic. Support for the British Army, who arrived in 1969, waxed and
waned throughout the Troubles. Questioning the efficacy of the British ground forces and
traditionally Protestant security forces, such as the Royal Ulster Constabulary and Ulster Defense
Regiment, caused many within the Protestant community to wrestle with the legitimacy of illegal
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paramilitaries, particularly the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Ulster Freedom Fighters—the nom
de guerre of the legal Ulster Defence Association who used the UFF title as a cover when
carrying out its violent campaign against the IRA and the Catholic population at large. Though
violence was one of the single largest indicators of Protestant Northern Ireland’s compromise of
physical and ideological space, other more official political occurrences, such as elections,
provide another gauge for understanding how Protestant politics were constantly being reshaped
throughout the early Troubles. This is mainly because the period witnessed numerous
reorganizations of Northern Ireland’s formal, electoral political landscape. Likewise, discussion
about the form and effect of parliamentary change will play a large role in the analysis of
Protestant political ideological development.
Up to this point what has been discussed was concerned with a general outline of the
theoretical framework that will be employed throughout this work. The form of the study,
methodology, and a brief description of the primary documentation to be examined will now be
discussed in order to elaborate on how Protestant politics existed under specific historical
circumstances. The body of this work will be organized into three chapters that are divided into
periods marked by major events that shaped the Northern Ireland Troubles.
Chapter one will cover from 1963 to 1972. The start date is significant because it marks
the beginning of Terence O’Neill’s premiership, a date many scholars have identified as a
starting point for Unionist disruption. As the notorious year of 1969 approached Marc
Mulholland observes “politics was now an affair of the streets.” 18 Mulholland’s fitting
description culminated with the 1972 suspension of Stormont, which returned Northern Ireland’s
rule to the Parliament at Westminster. The institutional realities of Northern Ireland were nearly
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unrecognizable. Protestants were forced to reckon with a state whose very foundations were
showing signs of faltering for the first time in fifty years. Coinciding with, and in part
responsible for, Stormont’s proroguing was the drastic escalation of violence that characterized
1972. That year witnessed the highest number of Troubles related deaths.
Continuing through the chaotic descent, chapter two will detail the period from 1972 to
1979. By late 1973 the Sunningdale Agreement had been agreed upon. A new power-sharing
executive would be elected and returned to Stormont by the beginning of 1974. Any government
that readily conceded political power to the Catholic minority was bound to meet an extreme
Protestant backlash. As such, by May of 1974, a loyalist coalition consisting of the major
paramilitary forces, the UDA and UVF, politicians such as Paisley and William Craig, and the
Ulster Workers Council—a political association consisting of Protestant workers—organized and
staged a fourteen day general strike that brought Northern Ireland and its new government to a
halt, again returning the governance of the province to Westminster. The strike was the cresting
of loyalist cooperation. Protestant politics would re-fragment into competing interests, and by the
late 1970s, Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries were beginning to formulate strategies within
the realm of formal politics, believing that mainstream politicians no longer represented their
interests.
In 1980 non-violent paramilitary politics could no longer be ignored. In October the IRA
embarked on its first hunger strike to protest the stripping of political status from their serving
prisoners. By 1981 a second hunger strike resulted in one of its participants, Bobby Sands, being
elected to Parliament, though he died soon after while still on strike. The public backlash would
help launch Sinn Féin, the IRA’s political wing, into electoral success, and though Protestant
paramilitaries and the working class communities they were associated with were slower to
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accept the notion of paramilitary politics, a growing need to articulate their political needs was
realized. Furthermore, like the IRA, many of the culture of protest, as well as the social and
political issues that most deeply affected Protestant working class paramilitary communities
were exacerbated within the prison system of Northern Ireland.
The divergence between working class paramilitary communities and more mainstream
Protestant politicians would provide yet another contention within the population, making unity
that much harder to achieve. The era beginning in the late 1970s and lasting through 1985 will be
the focus of the final chapter. It marks another period of deep fissures within the Protestant
community for many of the reasons discussed above. Also at this time, the British government
began to generate new ways to manage the situation in Northern Ireland with the hope of
bringing peace to the province. The outcome was the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which
proposed a strong cross border cooperation between the British government, any future devolved
Northern Ireland government, and the Republic of Ireland. Responses to the Agreement were
reminiscent of the Sunningdale era of the mid-1970s, only this time even more moderate
Unionist politicians, such as Harold McCusker, would join in protest with such extreme figures
as Paisley. 19
The Troubles were not technically ended until 1998, after the signing of the Good Friday,
or Belfast Peace Agreement. This study, however, will end in the era of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement because at that time the political possibilities of Northern Ireland were
incontrovertibly altered to a degree previously not witnessed in the short history of the province.
Not only were paramilitary organizations gaining political momentum outside the realm of
violence since the early 1980s, but the British government showed that it would, if necessary,
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completely circumvent its Ulster Protestant constituents in order to find a resolution to the
Troubles. Protestant Northern Ireland all but rejected its fealty to the UK government outside of
its minimal need to maintain its state’s continued existence.
Outside the strictly linear view presented above a comparative methodology will also be
employed throughout this study. By combining census materials and the geographic breakdown
of political violence throughout the Troubles it can be understood that Protestant political
motivations are largely informed by proximity to both violence and the neighboring Catholic
community. Considering this context along with other variables, like class, it can be deduced that
people’s experience of the Troubles varied widely depending on location. This study will
delineate between a number of those locations to again elucidate on the importance of place
when considering the complex diversity within the Protestant population. Regional comparisons
will be most fully elaborated in chapter one in order to illustrate the nature of existing sectarian
relationships that underpinned and found expression throughout the O’Neill era. There are three
primary locations that will be discussed: first, Belfast, the epicenter of the Troubles; second,
County Armagh, a precarious place for Protestants due to high levels of violence—most
comparable to Belfast—as well as its proximity with a Catholic majority and the border with the
Republic of Ireland; 20 and finally, Co. Antrim, a county that has an extreme Protestant majority,
who were largely insulated from the extremes of political violence throughout the Troubles, but
who nonetheless maintained a high degree of ideological certainty.
To examine these locations, and their wider contexts they help reveal, one of the main
sources of documentation to be used throughout this study will be local newspapers, including
Armagh’s Ulster Gazette and Antrim’s Ballymena Chronicle and Observer, though the Belfast
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News Letter will also have a main roll in this analysis. Considered together and against one
another, these newspapers are simultaneous representations of provincial as well as specifically
regional perspectives—two greatly connected areas of Protestant political discourse. To build
and support the analysis, specialized presses such as those of the Orange Order and the two
primary paramilitary organizations, the UVF and UDA, as well as numerous types of political
ephemera including speeches and party manifestos will be utilized as primary sources. These
sources will be further elaborated on by comparing their discursive tendencies to the statistical
sources previously mentioned, as well as local council and provincial election results. The use of
election results must be qualified: council elections, though based on local economic and social
issues specific to a small location, will be justifiably used in concert with the Stormont and
Westminster provincial elections because both forms of elections featured candidates who
focused their campaigns on the constitutional issue of the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland
state. Moreover, the validity of such a correlative body of evidence serves to further the
connection between Protestant notions of local autonomy and state legitimacy stressed
throughout this introduction. Taken together then, the primary documentation and the
supplemental statistical sources reveal the recalcitrant forces that informed developments within
Protestant Northern Ireland throughout the early Troubles.

13

Chapter One: Quaking Foundations, 1963-1972
When Captain Terence O’Neill became Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in March
1963, the Unionist political machine was functioning at characteristically ossified levels. His
quick rise through the ranks of Stormont after his election in 1946, and his stellar record as the
Minister of Finance assured that the Unionist Parliamentary Party would fully support his
appointment after the retirement of the current Premier, Lord Brookeborough. 1 The vast majority
of the Protestant community was also content with the belief that O’Neill would maintain the
locally based power structure that derived its authority from the Ulster Unionist Council; the
institution, dating back to 1905, was made up of 996 local Unionist organizations including party
branches and Orange lodges. The involvement of the Orange Order in the UUC is noteworthy.
Though never explicitly connected to the wider political goals of Protestant Northern Ireland, the
Order functioned as a central social institution that linked its rank-and-file Protestant
membership’s economic interests, devotional commitments, and cultural attitudes to the political
mechanisms of Unionism. The Council’s primary activity was approving candidates for local and
provincial offices, as well as identifying potential party leaders, but because the Council only
met en masse annually, regional branches, along with local Orange lodges, were the epicenters of
local government power. 2
Regional support for O’Neill was reflexively shown. Giving a nod to both O’Neill, and
the new first lady of Northern Ireland, the mayor of a County Antrim borough stated, “He is
practically a townsman and is well known to all of us here. Mrs. O’Neill has taken a keen interest
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in the affairs of the Borough.” 3 These sincere praises would turn to outright denunciations over
the course of O’Neill’s tenure due to his centralizing political strategies, persistent issues
rejuvenating the North’s stagnate economy, and his move toward a wider inclusion of the
Catholic minority in the political affairs of Northern Ireland. At the same time, the growing
demands of the Catholic civil rights movement throughout the late 1960s exacerbated the
growing anxieties of Protestant Northern Ireland. Protestant unity dissolved as their local
autonomy was being literally and symbolically eroded by the internal efforts of O’Neill.
Northern Ireland’s increasing sectarian animosity manifested into a rigorous series of
demonstrations and counter protests, which almost uniformly pitted Catholic against Protestant.
The sectarian campaigns of the IRA and emerging Protestant defense organizations serves as
another grim example of the eruption of ethnic tensions that initiated the onset of the Troubles.
Within this escalating chaos, Protestants became eager to accept the extreme measures of the
paramilitaries to ensure security; some still held out that traditional methods of legitimate state
force would subsist in returning peace to Northern Ireland, but by 1972 the province was on the
verge of collapse as Stormont was suspended and IRA violence reached heights never before
witnessed. In all, this period shattered Protestant notions of local autonomy as their relationship
to the Catholic community, and their place within the institutional structures of Northern Ireland
became reoriented, forcing many to completely abandon the Unionist Party. Though the 1960s
and early 1970s triggered the diffusion of Protestant political divergence—increasingly
characterized by ambivalence toward traditional Unionist authority—many of the economic and
social issues that predominated the O’Neill Premiership were already festering under the surface
of Unionist politics.

3
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Existing Economic Matters
Economically Northern Ireland had been declining since the end of World War II. By the
1950s half of all manufacturing jobs were held in two of Northern Ireland’s traditional sectors:
linen and shipbuilding. Moreover, Protestant workers traditionally dominated these industries,
but in 1964 the numbers employed by the linen and shipbuilding sectors alike fell by nearly forty
percent. One outcome of this was a shift in Belfast’s working class politics away from traditional
Unionism toward the Northern Ireland Labor Party. O’Neill had seemingly quelled Protestant
working class discontent in the mid-1960s by directly addressing their need for economic
security. 4 However, working class angst toward the established politics of both Stormont and
Westminster authorities would play a major role throughout the early Troubles and were indeed
finding expression throughout O’Neill’s time in office.
The social and economic needs of the working class, their relationship with the wider
power structures of the United Kingdom, and how Unionist representatives addressed working
class needs were given expression during a nearly month long seaman strike beginning in midMay 1966, which halted the shipment of food, mail, and fuel, causing massive infrastructural
stress in Northern Ireland. One underlying theme that emerged during the strike was the uneasy
dynamic between the governments of Stormont and Westminster. Graham Walker suggests that
in the mid-twentieth-century Unionism simultaneously expressed “the materialist benefits of
Britishness” and “suspiciousness” toward “English metropolitan condescension,” but at the time
of the strike, the ruling Unionist elites muted such suspicions in order to assure Northern
Ireland’s economic stability, even if it meant submitting to UK authority. Unionists fully
supported any action taken on part of the UK government, including the proposal to use the
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Royal Navy to break the strike. An unnamed Unionist representative said, “The possibility has
been discussed… but it is not our decision.” 5
In terms of inter-Protestant class dynamics, the seaman strike oppositely emphasizes both
the changing nature of Ulster’s working class within the wider context of Unionism, as well as
(though not all of the strikers were residents of Northern Ireland) the latent dissent that could be
mustered among segments of the Protestant working class in defiance of government authority.
As Peter Gibbon posits, the Protestant working class existed as a “labor aristocracy,” especially
Belfast’s skilled ship builders, who had become the primary center of relative economic
prosperity and local power in the city as early as 1887. 6 Furthermore, their predominant
placement and subsequent material advantage within the labor market of Northern Ireland made
them “willing” participants in the ethnically biased structures of existing Unionist Politics. But
considering the downtrodden state of Northern Ireland’s economy in the mid-1960s such
arguments omit the contours within the Protestant working class itself, and ignores possible
variations in their political responses, which was represented by both the progressive initiatives
developed by the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defence Association throughout the 1970s,
as well as their willingness to disregard official authority and engage in extreme violence. 7
Restated, the seaman strike was an early example of the separatist power that the Protestant
working class would come to realize throughout the early Troubles because the strikers, though
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acting purely on behalf of economic interest, caused political shock to both the Stormont and
Westminster regimes.

Centralized Authority Under O’Neill
Local sources of elite Protestant political power were also experiencing growing
discontent with the O’Neill led Stormont government. The Lockwood Report of February 1965
proposed the construction of a new university in the city of Coleraine, as well as the possible
closing of Londonderry’s Magee University College. The O’Neill government quickly adopted
the first proposition of the report while foregoing the implementation of the second point. 8 The
government’s actions directly opposed the popular sentiments of both Unionist and Nationalist
MPs throughout the province, who believed that Londonderry would have made a better location
for the university. The immediate fallout from the government’s adoption of the Lockwood
Report resulted in the organization of a massive “Siege of Stormont” by over a thousand
protesters calling themselves the University for Derry Action Committee, who made their way
from Londonderry to Belfast on February 18—mere weeks after the publication of the
Lockwood report. The protest was not successful. There was cooperation between the protesters
and the police despite the high probability of disorder and violence. 9 Seeing no serious threat to
his decision following the failure of the Action Committee O’Neill proceeded to implement his
original plan. Unionist fears over O’Neill’s lack of consideration for issues on a local level in
favor of a provincially geared “dictatorial government” were greatly engendered by his handling
of the Lockwood Report. 10 Moreover, prominent historian Marc Mulholland succinctly
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summates the issue of university planning when he asserts that O’Neill chose to deal with
Unionist interests who were decidedly engaging in “narrow-minded bigotry” against Derry’s
majority Catholic population, despite greater Unionist support for the new university to be
located in the city. 11 Though O’Neill’s actions can be seen as a boon to the maintenance of
Protestant hegemony, the point remains that O’Neill was acting outside of popular Unionist
demand, a notion antithetical to Unionist political organization up to that point. O’Neill’s
dismissal of the Londonderry university program also greatly contributed to his complex
relationship with the Catholic minority, and how his attempts to bridge the sectarian gap were
perceived by Protestant and Catholic alike.

The State of Sectarianism
O’Neill’s sincerity when dealing with the Catholic minority and Northern Ireland’s
sectarian divide more generally has been thoroughly questioned and, in some instances, outright
dismissed by many commentators. Walker skeptically refers to O’Neill’s visits to Catholic
schools and his condolences for the death of Pope John XXIII in 1963 as “gesture politics” 12
because they seemed harmless yet difficult to interpret, especially for more moderate Protestants.
A curious example of Protestant confusion over O’Neill’s responses to the death of the Pope
appears in Armagh’s Ulster Gazette on June 6, 1963. The article compliments Pope John’s
endorsement of “Christian Unity” and praises O’Neill’s humble message praising the Pope’s
“kindness and humanity,” while also including the march to Belfast City Hall led by Ian Paisley
in protest of the hanging of the Union flag at half-mast in honor of the deceased Pontiff. The
article ends with a listing of Mass arrangements and details the tributes paid by Armagh’s
11
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Catholic authorities. On the next page there appears a rather puzzling article, considering the
occasion. The article, “Religious Viewpoint,” triumphantly details the life and philosophy of
John Calvin, who, as the article implicitly relates, questioned the very foundations of the
hierarchy of the Catholic Church, of which the Pope is head: the visible Church “contains those
whose professions of faith is hypocritical,” and furthermore, the “sovereignty of God” is
absolute, while the “priesthood of all believers” can allot salvation to all who have been granted
God’s Grace. 13 Though not engaging in direct anti-Catholicism this article, and the date on
which it was printed, points to a consistent undercurrent of sectarian division between Ulster’s
Catholic and Protestant populations that was an influential factor in forming both moderate and
extreme brands political action.
The Protestant community did not universally adhere to the ambivalent sectarianism of
the early 1960s, as reflected in the pages of the Ulster Gazette. A confessional Protestant
backlash against O’Neill and the larger ecumenical movement was heard primarily in the
bellowing voice of the Rev. Ian Paisley. In his thorough analysis, Steve Bruce sums up the
driving force behind Paisley, his tactics, and his followers when he states that “Evangelical
Protestantism” is concerned with the religious but also the “social and the political.” As such, the
evangelical tradition in Ulster has been fervently and publicly against Roman Catholicism, but
also any institution, religious or otherwise, that positively invites ecumenism or cooperation with
the Roman Church, including the government of Northern Ireland. As briefly mentioned above,
Paisley’s reaction to the O’Neill’s letter of condolence to the Vatican upon the death of Pope
John in 1963, though harsh, was typical in its anti-Catholic fervor. Paisley renounced the “lying
eulogies now being paid to the Roman antichrist.” And though such statements have explicitly
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religious overtones, for followers of Paisley’s message Northern Ireland’s constitutional politics
and confessional denomination are one in the same. 14 By 1966 Paisley’s views continued to be
guided by the rhetoric of the “treachery of O’Neill’s policies,” with “his ecumenical and Papist
supporters” never far from condemnation. Further defining Paisley’s dogmatic message was the
undercurrent of apocalyptic prophesying that predominated it. The rise of ecumenism paired with
the perception that O’Neill was prompting greater Catholic, and thus Church involvement in the
state functions of Northern Ireland, was for many followers of Paisley’s fundamentalist teachings
a trigger for the biblical end times forecast by the book of Revelations. Proactive action infused
with at least the threat of violence was viewed as the legitimate response to this ultimate battle
between the forces of Protestant purity and Catholic deceit. 15 Paisley’s emerging presence as the
constant voice of combative opposition to the perceived “Unionist oligarchs,” such as O’Neill, as
well as the swell of Catholic resistance to state institutions, propelled him toward political
success beginning in the 1970s, 16 when his purely confessional preaching would expand to
attract more secular audiences.
Even those who would support Paisley behind closed doors were still moderate in their
public political responses to O’Neill’s policies, as exemplified by reports appearing in an early
strong hold of Paisleyite Protestantism, Co. Antrim. Appearing in the Ballymena Observer
following an ad for an anti-ecumenical rally being held by Paisley, was an article that presented
local religious figure, Rev. Dr. Fulton’s views, which “repudiated the fears that the World
Council of Churches” would eventually lead to a “move towards Rome,” a mirrored challenge of
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typical Paisleyite complaints. 17 Much like the Gazette article’s presentation of the Pope’s death,
Fulton’s views, and the Observer’s presentation of them, points to a tension within Protestantism
between moderate, benign sectarianism, and its belligerently active counterpart.
A contributing factor to Protestant sectarianism was based on geographic location and
population demographics. The population of Co. Armagh, and its immediate surrounding
districts, contains approximately 191 thousand people, of whom seventy-eight thousand are
Catholic versus only fifty-five thousand Protestants according to census data from 1981 (the
remaining population was unreported). Comparatively, Co. Antrim has a nearly four to one ratio
between Protestants and Catholics and more than double the area of Armagh. 18 Therefore,
Armagh Protestants were in greater contact with the neighboring Catholic population, and thus
their politics developed in direct response to the other—unlike Antrim Protestants, who were
more insulated from the effects of Catholic motivations, and likewise developed their political
and religious practices outside of the contexts possible Catholic accommodation. The
demographic differences between the political and sectarian formulations of Antrim and Armagh
Protestants encapsulates how various forms of deeply engrained sectarian attitudes contributed to
converging ideological developments of the 1960s. To draw a further comparison, Belfast’s
population demographics and disbursement are useful. Throughout 1970s and 1980s Protestants
made up around seventy percent of Belfast’s urban population; however, over the same period,
segregation is calculated to have increased by over ten percent. Likewise, Protestants
consistently lived in areas of over eighty percent ethnic uniformity. Violent conflict spurred by
political upheaval, and continuing ethno-sectarian claims hardened the communal division of
Belfast’s largely working class neighborhoods. The case was much the same throughout Armagh
17

“Hear Rev. Ian Paisley in Caddy Orange Hall on Thursday, May 28,” Ballymena Observer, May 21, 1964.
Department of Health and Social Services Registrar General Northern Ireland, The Northern Ireland Census,
1981 (Belfast: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1981), 3, 50.

18

22

and Antrim, where geographic and ideologically divided communities would give way to
assertively sectarian behavior throughout the 1960s. 19 O’Neill’s campaign for modernization
would continue to shock the sectarian balance that was maintained in many areas of Northern
Ireland when he invited cross border interaction with the provinces southern neighbor.
On January 14, 1965 Terence O’Neill met with the Republic of Ireland’s Taoiseach, Sean
Lemass, to consider the possibility for future cooperation between the two states. The Stormont
meeting was innocently symbolic: champagne was enjoyed, pleasantries exchanged, and
“common interests” suggested, with constitutional issues specifically left out of the conversation.
The Belfast News Letter reported support for the meeting as “unanimous.” Many street
respondents shared positive views, though one man did bring up the hollowness of such a
meeting “as long as the IRA are allowed to continue functioning in the South.” And of course,
Paisley led a march on Stormont to protest the meeting. 20 By the end of February, the two
executives met again in Belfast and the outcome was much the same; Paisley protested, but most
still supported the meeting. In fact, the staunchly Protestant Orange Order publically agreed that
the meeting was positive and, in fact, helped bolster Northern Ireland’s constitutional position
because merely agreeing to meet with Lemass was seen as a legitimating Northern Ireland’s
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statehood. 21 As 1965 came to a close, the positive responses to the O’Neill, Lemass meetings
quickly faded as the old specter of republicanism reemerged.
Nineteen sixty-six marked a drastic increase in the intensity and volume of overtly
sectarian Protestant political expressions. Much of the anxiety exuded by Protestant extremists at
the time was related to the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising and its celebratory
commemorations, which in the minds of many Protestants would certainly be accompanied by a
renewed clamor for republican action. In the early morning of Sunday, June 26, eighteen-yearold Catholic, Peter Ward, was killed outside of the Malvern Arms in West Belfast. Two of his
friends were also wounded when a flurry of shots was wildly directed toward them. Both
survived the attack. 22 The three gunmen were arrested and found guilty of murder. A month
earlier, another Catholic, John Scullion, was murdered while walking the streets of the Falls area
of West Belfast, though the supposed target was republican, Leo Martin. In the same period a
Catholic owned bar was the target of an arson attack. An elderly Protestant woman would die
weeks later of burns sustained in the fire. These violent actions were claimed by a group
fashioning itself the Ulster Volunteer Force, so named after the group formed in 1912 to combat
Irish Home Rule. Prime Minister O’Neill immediately proscribed the UVF. The men responsible
all came from the Shankill area of West Belfast, a center for Protestant sectarianism throughout
the Troubles. Likewise, many early members of the UVF were connected with other
organizations including the Ulster Protestant Action and the Ulster Protestant Volunteers, all of
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whom claimed to defending Protestant Northern Ireland from Catholic, republican activism. 23
Some commentators, such as documentarian David Boulton, would claim that dual membership
was more reflective of a Protestant conspiracy led by Paisley, who simultaneously publicly
renounced extra-legal violence while actively organizing and planning the activities of such
groups as the UVF in private. 24 However, due to the illegal nature of the paramilitaries and the
closely linked communities they were active in, informal communication links and dual
membership between groups were inevitable. Likewise, Paisley’s role as a paramilitary
champion, as will be discussed later, was to become a major point of contention for those
activists who engaged in what they considered to be the ‘dirty work’ of community defense,
while Paisley stayed atop his soapbox espousing the need for action against republican threat.
The fear of republican violence was certainly not unfounded. Multiple reports from July
1966 reveal that the IRA was indeed actively training on Northern Ireland’s border. Despite the
pleads from voices such as Minister of Agriculture, Harry West, who called for “sound
judgment” in this “most dangerous situation,” the heckling voices of Paisleyite supporters and
the speeches given at many Orange Twelfth events showed a growing willingness toward
extremism, though the violence associated with the UVF was roundly criticized. 25 In typically
dichotomous form, the Ulster Gazette described Armagh’s local Twelfth speeches, highlighting
both the support for the O’Neill government’s “successful endeavors for the material prosperity
of Northern Ireland,” while warning that the “determination in maintaining our constitutional
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integrity” was possibly under threat. Also, within a rhetoric of Protestant triumphalism and
denunciations of ecumenism, there was a hypocritical emphasis on “tolerance and self discipline
shown by the Orangemen and Loyalists,” yet such qualities were “not to be mistaken for
weakness.” 26
In similar speeches in Antrim, a local chaplain renounced the UVF killing of Peter Ward
as “nonsense and insanity,” and called for a reassertion of “Protestant principles.” Antrim
however, was far from united in its rejection of extremism. Weeks later the paper published a
letter to the editor that proposed the growing popularity of Paisley’s Protestant Telegraph at the
recent Orange Twelfth festivities,27 and though Paisley distanced himself from violence, his
blood and thunder anti-Catholicism certainly stirred many toward such responses. As the 1960s
wore on, the political pressure Protestants were experiencing was still largely symbolic in nature.
The Lemass meetings, the Easter Rising commemorations, and the overestimation of IRA border
activity became linked with the erosion of the legitimacy of Northern Ireland, encouraging
growing numbers to adopt a grassroots extremism embodied by Paisleyism and the growing
organization of paramilitary groups, such as the UVF. The late 1960s saw another jilt to the
security of Protestant power in the form of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and
their campaign to combat discrimination against Catholics.

Protestant Perceptions of the Civil Rights Movement
The issues raised by the NICRA, following John Whyte’s skeptical, yet astute study, fall
under six main categories: electoral practices, particularly the extension of the local franchise
and the gerrymandering of districts to ensure a Unionist majority on local councils—
26
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Londonderry being the most notable point of contention due to the fact that it had Unionist
dominated council despite an overall Catholic majority population—public and private
employment opportunities, the allotment of public housing, and government allocated regional
development. Finally, the NICRA demanded reform of two state policing practices. First, the
NICRA wanted to see the notoriously sectarian make-up of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, who
as of 1969 was ninety percent Protestant, reduced, thus limiting its perception and practice as a
sectarian body. The second item the NICRA took issue with was the Special Powers Act, first
passed in 1922, which allowed for the government to ban “subversive,” meaning Catholic or
republican, meetings and publications. Internment without trial was another major part of the
Special Powers Act that had been and would continue to be used throughout the Troubles,
mainly against the Catholic community. 28 The scope of this study does not allow for an in depth
discussion into the extent of discrimination though there was certainly credibility to many of the
claims made by the NICRA. What is important for the purposes of this research is how did
Protestants perceive the civil rights movement? Many denied the claims of discrimination
outright, while others justified them in various underhanded ways, positing, for instance, that
Catholics actually denied themselves government participation, both as voters and officials;
actions that were seen as active ways to undermine the state. Working class Protestant views on
the civil rights movement are much more striking because they in fact shared the same
grievances the NICRA claimed against the ruling Unionist classes; however, most Protestants,
regardless of class, believed that the NICRA was little more than a front for the IRA. 29 These
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views proliferated as the NICRA began its public marches; sectarianism became a rampant force
in Northern Ireland.
In October 1967 the NICRA announced their intention to stage a peaceful march in
Londonderry, but the Minister of Home Affairs and staunch loyalist William Craig banned it. 30
Public protest however would be implemented with drastic effect in the year to come by both the
NICRA and a militant offshoot calling itself the People’s Democracy. The response of Protestant
Northern Ireland was intense and rapid because in its ideological immediacy “Marches… mean
the assertion of territorial sectarian claims.” 31 On January 4, 1968 these sectarian claims erupted
into to a violent clash when cudgel wielding, stone throwing, Protestant loyalists ambushed PD
marchers at Burntollet Bridge, outside of Londonderry. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that
the RUC did not protect the marchers against loyalist attacks and in some instances “encouraged
the attacks.” 32
Marches and counter riots became the norm as 1968 continued. Protestant Northern
Ireland was certain that civil rights and Catholic public disorder was connected to violent
republicanism. A civil rights march in Londonderry on October 5 paired with the revelation that
the IRA was most definitely involved served to exacerbate Protestant sectarian assumptions. The
Belfast News Letter, the ever-loyal organ of Protestant opinion, related that not only were the
marchers quick to turn toward violence against the RUC, but that they immediately cried foul
play and claimed that the RUC were the aggressors. The News Letter quickly turned from its
report on the unruly marchers to a story claiming that William Craig stated in a press conference
that he received photographic evidence that Cathal Goulding, a leading IRA figure, participated
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in the Londonderry march. 33 Likewise, reports appeared in Armagh that prominent Unionist and
future Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, declared that the civil rights movement was “a very
convenient banner for a Republican faction to hoist aloft,” though denying that many in the
Catholic community would support such intentions. 34 Unsurprisingly, Paisleyite opinion claimed
“Civil Rights is Rome’s camouflage, aimed at bringing Ulster into the fold of the Irish
Republic.” Support was also given to rising loyalist personality William Craig, who had recently
been ousted from the Unionist Parliamentary Party after consistent brush-ups with Terence
O’Neill. 35 Protestant opinion was inundated by public expressions connecting the civil rights
movement to republican activism. Under such pressure, in hopes of placating the Catholic
community, O’Neill introduced a Five-Point Reform package that promised to overhaul the local
voting system by 1971, revise the Special Powers Act, and offer specific reforms for
Londonderry, including the appointment of an ombudsman for housing grievances and a
redrawing of the Londonderry Urban Corporation in order to allot Catholics greater
representation in the city’s local government. Craig was among the most vocal critics of
O’Neill’s reform deal, especially referring to the proposed changes to the Special Powers Act, 36
as it had been originally concocted to bolster Protestant security against republicanism since the
states formation in 1921.
With a Stormont general election set for the end of February 1969, the Unionist Party was
drastically split over O’Neill’s reforms. Likewise, many Protestant political parties, such as
Paisley’s Protestant Unionist Party, had completely split from Unionism and would campaign in
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the upcoming election. Though considered a positive sign of support for the Prime Minister,
whose supporting candidates received over forty percent of the vote, 37 constitutional politics had
declined in importance as street politics gained influence. O’Neill would eventually resign in
April. As Mulholland reflects, “Violence had at last reached a powder keg… A cycle of sectarian
escalation was virtually unstoppable.” 38 Organized republicanism had indeed resurfaced in the
riots of August, killing Protestant Herbert Roy during widespread rioting in Belfast on the
fourteenth. The UVF was also active in Belfast, killing RUC officer Victor Arbuckle during
Protestant rioting in October in response to the Hunt Report. The report found that the RUC was
indeed guilty of many of the sectarian assertions that they were traditionally accused. In light of
its findings, the report proposed a drive to recruit more Catholics into the ranks of the force,
stripping the RUC of its automatic weapons, vehicles, and any military role it had. 39 Finally, and
most devastating for the Protestant community was that the Report called for the disbandment of
the Ulster Special Constabulary, or B-Specials, an organization that since its formation in 1920
had operated largely on the premises of a community maintained, publicly funded, Protestant
vigilante force that could be quickly called upon to quell civil unrest. It should be no surprise that
the Specials, with its entirely Protestant membership, was often a source sectarian violence
throughout its existence. 40
In a concise summation of the provinces rampant sectarianism, the Ulster Gazette printed
the headline, “North Hell-bent on Own Destruction.” The paper mentioned that extremists on
both sides helped plunge not only the centers of Belfast and Londonderry into chaos but the
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towns of Starbane, Dungannon, and Coalisland. Limited activity was also reported in Armagh,
including the petrol bombing of a Protestant shop in the predominately Catholic town of
Crossmaglen and what could have possibly been a retaliatory bombing of a “disused Roman
Catholic Boys’ Club”. 41 In a surprisingly moderate speech outside of Ballymena in May, Paisley,
the campaigning politician, called for support of the new prime minister, Major ChichesterClark, and that all issues of law and order should be left to the police. Appealing to the Protestant
heartland of Antrim, Paisley continued, “Only one power can save Ulster today and that is the
power of God.” Even during the height of the August riots, the Ballymena Observer printed a
letter critical of a previously printed loyalist correspondence. “Antrim John” called into question
loyalist rhetoric that apparently called for stronger border security due to the Irish Republic’s
organization of field hospitals along the border. The level headed “John” stated that the field
hospitals should be allowed to operate primarily for those innocent Catholics who wished to
avoid visiting Northern hospitals to lessen the likelihood of being arrested under the Special
Powers Act. 42 Paisley’s keen politicking and his call for rational understanding among Antrim
citizens would be a persistent theme despite their devout Protestantism that often times resulted
in sectarian expressions in other parts of Northern Ireland, especially Belfast. Antrim’s tendency
toward moderation was in part due to their general isolation from civil upheaval and violence of
the late 1960s and early 1970s. But as the 1960s came to a close the Unionist Party was in
shambles, and Protestants more generally were facing increasing pressure to further compromise
an ever-shrinking political control with a Catholic neighbor they were now violently opposed to
in many areas.
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Divergent Political Establishments
1970 signifies a year of drastic political polarization for the Protestant community as two
fundamentally opposite groups entered the arena of constitutional politics. In a 1970 Stormont
By-Election, Rev. Paisley won the Bannside district, receiving nearly forty-five percent of the
vote. Furthermore, one of his Protestant Unionist associates, Rev. William Beattie, won a close
election in South Antrim. 43 Co. Antrim was alight with Paisley-mania, and he would soon be
elected to the Parliament at Westminster that coming June. Paisley appealed to the Antrim
constituents’ sense of symbolic loyalism in an early campaign speech, while being careful to
avoid his violent outbursts. He rallied against “Romanists” and “Harold Wilson’s Socialists” (the
term “Socialist” here being a derogatory reflection of the persistent historical opinion of Ulster
Protestants’ toward the UK’s Labour party, who it was perceived was always likely to sell-out
Northern Ireland. Compared to the supportive nature of Labour’s conservative counterpart). 44 At
the same time, he was critical of the Stormont government and instilled the idea that despite
Antrim being sheltered from much IRA activity the whole province was vulnerable because “the
U.S.C was the only force the Republicans feared,” and “you cannot have economic prosperity
until law and order are restored to every street in the Province.” 45 As has been established,
though not a violently extreme region of Protestant Northern Ireland, Antrim was willing to
accept men like Paisley because he articulated their symbolic values: the security of the
province, an innate, yet often times benign sectarianism, and a general distrust of government
institutions—the more distant the less trustworthy. Such political characteristics coalesced into
“a narrow interpretation of the Protestant ‘Ascendancy.” But by early 1971, Paisley would seek
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to reach beyond such “rural evangelicals” and form the Democratic Unionist Party, which
broadened his constituency to include “urban ‘secular’ Protestants,” epitomized by early DUP
politician Johnny McQuade, a working class Protestant dock worker and ex-soldier. 46
Establishing the opposite end of the newly emerging Protestant political spectrum was the
Alliance Party, formed in mid-1970, who has been aptly described as “a party of graduate
professionals containing a substantial number of above-average earners.” 47 Considering this, it is
not difficult to see that the Alliance Party ostracized more voters than it attracted. One of the
party’s first manifestos reveals the depths of their lofty but grandiose political vision: “For fifty
years too many of us have accepted the narrow strictures of the 1920’s…The ruling Unionist
Party stands convicted of sectarianism… with its divisive and undemocratic links to the Orange
Order… The Union is in the best economic and social interests of the citizens,” and that the
“Equality of social, economic and educational opportunities” should be extended to all. 48
Focusing on the documents relevance to Protestant voters, it begins by refuting the validity of the
Unionist Party, as well as a fundamentally Protestant institution, the Orange Order. Even though
the Unionist Party and the Orange Order were certainly declining in popularity, the abstract
sense of symbolism evoked by such institutions was dear to many Protestant’s—especially
working class Protestants, who made up the bulk of the Order’s membership— was now being
fundamentally called into question by the Alliance Party’s mandate. Finally, in a period riven by
sectarianism, simply calling for its mending was bound to fail because, regardless of its violent
potential, sectarian attitudes were foundational to understanding one’s place within the political
landscape of Northern Ireland. Alliance’s failure to recruit the Protestant population was again
46
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exemplified concurrently by Antrim’s acceptance of Paisley’s Protestant Unionist Party. Such
Ambivalent sectarianism also appears in Armagh, where addressing a Junior Orange Association
meeting, local religious leader Rev. Taylor stated “the Roman Catholic religion is corrupt, evil
and wrong,” but Protestants must “show love to their Roman Catholic neighbors.” 49 Despite the
growing influence of loyalists such as Paisley, sectarian violence stayed at manageably contained
levels throughout 1970, but 1971 would see a drastic expansion of the IRA’s campaign. A rise in
Protestant militancy would follow.

Protestant Paramilitary Organization
In a year in which IRA violence claimed 107 lives, compared to twenty-one in 1970, it
appeared that by the end of 1971 Protestant Northern Ireland was turning toward violent
reaction. 50 In December the Grand Orange Lodge released the following statement: “Loyalists
throughout Ulster should take all necessary steps to defend themselves, their homes, and their
property against murderous attacks by the IRA.” It warned, “Should the democratic process be
ignored or avoided the loyalist population should prepare for a programme of disobedience.”
Days before the Orange Order’s statement action against the IRA was already being executed.
On December 4, a bomb exploded inside McGurk’s Bar on North Queen Street in Belfast.
Fifteen Catholics were killed in the blast. The bomb was planted by the UVF. 51 In a statement
published weeks later in the WDA (Woodvale Defence Association) News sources claimed,
“while sympathy is extended to the families of those killed, it should be noted that these people
[Catholic victims] have never condemned the IRA.” The bombing of McGurk’s Bar, as well as
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the subsequent justifications for the explosion, point to a common refrain amongst paramilitary
participants: despite their self-image asserting that the IRA “were the aggressors; loyalists were
defenders” 52 many came to the “determination that maybe the best means of defence is attack,”
while completely ignoring the sectarian motivations that inspired such actions. 53
Ending with the spectacular horror at McGurk’s Bar, demonstratively announcing the
reemergence of the UVF, 1971 was an important year for the development of the Protestant
paramilitary action more generally. Throughout Belfast numerous neighborhood vigilante groups
formed to protect their communities from IRA attack. They held regionally specific names such
as the Woodvale Defence Association, the Oldpark Defence Association, and Shankill Defence
Association. After months of perpetual street violence, many members began to believe that a
closer communication between the many regional teams was needed. In a meeting chaired by
dockworker and Shankill native, Ingram Beckitt, the Ulster Defence Association was born, and
by the third meeting, almost three thousand people were in attendance—a drastic increase form
the eighteen who attended the first. 54
With increased communication, a growing expression of political need emerged,
revealing a strong working class directive. Belfast’s emerging “Paramilitants and community
activists became far more prepared to carry out political or military action independently,”
regardless of recent mainstream success by loyalist politicians such as Paisley and Craig. 55
Underlying much working class Protestant political thought was “a critique of the Unionist
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ascendancy” 56—the elitist Unionist power structure that could boldly adopt a rhetoric that
damned the IRA and its goals, while never having to take the brunt of their violence—the vast
majority of which was meted out to the working classes on both sides of the sectarian divide. In a
denunciation of a Fermanagh Unionist MP, who apparently stated “he could not blame the
Terrorists for the new wave of shootings… but put the blame on Unionist Misrule,” a WDA News
writer, calling himself only “TRUE LOYALIST,” stated that in fact “Unionist Misrule” is to
blame, but
Surely even you [Fermanagh MP] should know that the rules were not made by any of
the victims of these savage bombings but by the Unionist Government and therefore you
cannot do anything but agree that these madmen are attacking the wrong people. But
wisely they have chosen for if one hair of anyone of these so-called MP’s was put out of
place then and only then would the terrorist be finished. 57
The divide between working class constituents and elite politicians that is so demonstratively
expressed in the above excerpt would be a constant in Protestant politics throughout the early
Troubles, even within loyalism itself.

Conclusion
As the nine-year anniversary of the beginning of Terence O’Neill’s Premiership
approached Unionist unity was non-existent and many of the bulwarks of Protestant political
ideology and material control had vanished. The RUC had a fleeting power over security, the
symbolic arm of physical Protestant security, the USC, was disbanded, and IRA efforts seemed
to be achieving its aims at a horrific cost in spite of the introduction of internment in August
1971. Finally, in March 1972 the symbol of Northern Ireland self-determination, Stormont, was
prorogued and the governance of Ulster was returned to Westminster for the first time since the
56
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1920s. Responding to this devastating blow, MP W.J. Long, in an address to a no doubt battleweary Shankill audience, hopelessly promised, “I shall do all that I can do to assist the minister’s
charged with the impossible task of compensating for the loss of regional government.” 58 Even
the confidently assertive voices of loyalism were at odds as to what should be done next.
Catching the scent of possible sensationalism, the UK’s Daily Mail briefly outlined Craig’s push
for a Unilateral Declaration of Independence while Paisley pursued full integration as a means
for securing a parliamentary place for Protestant issues to be heard. What is clear, as the Daily
Mail cleverly revealed, was that Protestant Ulster had no one voice. 59 Protestant politics existed
as a cacophony of anxious expressions desperately echoing the primary goal of preserving the
state of Northern Ireland, a concept once justified by institutional integrity, but whose future
existence was no longer guaranteed. As 1972 continued, an already bewildered population would
have to face the viciousness of an unstoppably rampant IRA campaign, which was to be met with
the outbreak of frenzied Protestant paramilitary violence.
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Chapter Two: Abysmal Dejection, 1972-1979
On July 21, 1972, Belfast’s City Centre was devastated when the IRA set off twenty
bombs over the course of just over an hour, killing nine people and injuring a further 130 in an
attack that soon became known as Bloody Friday. Among the victims was eighteen-year-old
William Irvine, a Protestant from East Belfast. 1 David Irvine explains the impact of Bloody
Friday and William Irvine’s death: “The moment of ‘Bloody Friday’ when there was a lad killed
with the same name as me. He lived close by and people thought it was me, and it could have
been me. At this point I went over the edge.” 2 In Irvine’s case the edge referred to joining the
Ulster Volunteer Force. Though Irvine’s rise to political prominence in the post ceasefire era of
the Troubles is notable, the push over the edge he experienced was not exceptional. Peter
McGuire, a UDA member from Londonderry, recalls the moments when he began to turn toward
militant Protestant action: “It was whilst going to and from school [in the early 1970’s] that I
witnessed two scenes that have had a major impact on my life.” The scenes McGuire relates
were in fact two IRA murders on local acquaintances of his. McGuire continues: “No-one has
ever been charged with these murders, and even then I knew that RUC was incapable of ever
catching anyone.” 3
The examples of Irvine and McGuire are instructive when considering the early postStormont era because they help identify the shifting acceptances that many Ulster Protestants
were experiencing, regarding the legitimacy and possible effectiveness of violence within the
contexts of defense against both the increasing IRA onslaught and the ever more fragile
constitutional position of the Protestant community within the state of Northern Ireland. Mid1
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Ulster Unionist candidate Verdun Wright stated in a June 1973 speech that “Terrorism will only
be destroyed when the position is made unmistakably clear… that the constitutional position of
Northern Ireland is not an issue that can be affected through these means.” 4 Of course the
terrorism Wright referred to was that of the IRA, but what will become clear over the course of
this chapter is that throughout the 1970s Protestant Northern Ireland had an incredibly complex
relationship with how and to what degree violence could be implemented as they strove to
redefine and maintain their place within the shifting dynamics of Northern Ireland’s political
scene. Violent loyalism found its moment of greatest support in the mid-1970s, but by the late
1970s, the Protestant community largely rejected its value as a legitimate means of political
expression, following nearly a decade of intense violence. Outside the realm of violent reaction
however, loyalism’s non-compromise toward the Catholic community and the governments of
Westminster and Dublin was firmly entrenched in the social and political landscape of many
Protestant communities by the late 1970s.

Welcoming the Paramilitaries
By the beginning of 1972, 200 Troubles related deaths had already been recorded, nearly
doubling the total from the previous years of conflict. For many Protestants this period of intense
violence brought feelings of helplessness, causing many to turn toward extreme elements within
their own community. On the evening of June 28, the inner council of the UDA announced that
the organization was to begin construction of Protestant “no-go” areas in Belfast and
Londonderry despite the urging of Westminster appointed Secretary of State, William Whitelaw.
The Protestant “no-go” areas were meant to strongly resemble and, in fact, be a direct response
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to those constructed in predominately Catholic areas, such as the “Free Derry” zone in the
Boggside of Londonderry. The barricades, as well as the “UDA police” who were to occupy the
zones, were symbolic gestures to the British Army and Whitelaw, who, it was believed, could no
longer protect Protestant Northern Ireland from the IRA, who were at the time engaged in a
fruitless cease-fire. 5
Outside of the traditional focal points of political violence, Belfast and Londonderry,
other Protestant inhabited regions of Northern Ireland began to welcome UDA action into their
communities. At Ulster Vanguard’s first public rally, disgruntled Unionist and former O’Neill
cabinet member William Craig’s political initiative was accompanied by four battalions of
masked UDA men who were cheered by on-looking supporters as they marched toward the local
Orange hall. 6 Parliamentary political forces were beginning to go hand in hand with vigilante
action.
Moreover, the ever-tense Orange Order marching season of mid-July saw UDA “no-go”
barricades constructed in Cullybackey—a town northeast of Ballymena, County Antrim—to
protect marchers from possible attack. 7 In chapter one Antrim was discussed in terms of its
insulation from much Troubles related violence. To illustrate this point, one need look little
farther than an article printed at the end of 1971 in the Ballymena Observer sub-titled “Terrorism
on the whole by-passes prosperous and neighborly area,” 8 but by 1972 IRA violence was
becoming more prevalent, which, when paired with a growing sense of disenchantment with
legal security operations, greatly explains why the UDA was increasingly perceived as a
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legitimate force for local protection. It also must be made clear that 1972 saw an extreme
upsurge in the amount of Protestant paramilitary violence. Loyalist activity claimed 121 lives
throughout the year compared to twenty-nine in the years stretching back to 1966. 9 Though
violence pervaded everyday life forcing many to define their relationship to such actions, a
return to democratic participation was to become another gauge of Protestant political thought.

Electoral Politics in the Sunningdale Era
The first elections since the proroguing of Stormont were set to take place in 1973 under
the dual pressures of a reorganized electoral system and a further constitutional proposal
negotiated between Northern Ireland politicians and Whitelaw. In the lead up to the May 1973
local district elections, Protestant politics “presented a jumble of disaffected groups and
competing visions” encompassed by the Unionist acceptance of a Westminster White Paper that
proposed the organization of a power-sharing government at Stormont and the construction of a
North-South Irish Council. The all-Ireland Council and a mandatory power-sharing government
forged a rejectionist loyalist coalition, including the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party, the
Paisley lead DUP, Unionist Party members, such as James Molyneaux and Rev. Martin Smyth,
leader of the Orange Order, and the paramilitary representatives from the UDA and Loyalist
Association of Workers. Former prime minister, Brian Faulkner, represented a shrinking faction
of Unionists who supported the White Paper against an increasingly unified loyalist front. 10 The
results of such division were evident in the local government results. In total seventy-four of the
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307 Protestant candidates elected were not members of the Official Unionist Party (formerly the
Ulster Unionist Party). 11
The split in the Unionist Party led anti-Faulkner supporters, including Harry West and
Molyneaux, to be disallowed participation in the December conference in Sunningdale, England,
which included members of the nationalist SDLP, the Alliance Party, pro-Faulkner Unionists,
and representatives from both the Republican of Ireland and UK governments—the group tasked
with negotiating and implementing the basic principles of the White Paper. The Unionist
dissenters quickly severed their links with the party and joined the VUPP and DUP in forming
the United Ulster Unionist Council, the emerging bastion for Protestant political representation. 12
Certain that the southern Republic was going to gain control over Northern politics, and thus
perceiving that republican violence had succeeded, the majority of Protestant Northern Ireland
was now all but fully accepting loyalist political views on the eve of the new executive taking
office in January 1974. The call to arms was made clear in the UDA’s publication, Loyalist
News: “ALL COLLABORATORS” who support Faulkner and the Sunningdale Communiqué
“should be made to feel the wrath of our People.” 13 The power of “our People” was to be
thoroughly exercised in the upcoming months, culminating with the organization and execution
of the Ulster Workers’ Council Strike.
Upon the release of the Communiqué, moderate Protestant voices were even reluctant to
praise the outcomes of the Sunningdale Conference. East Belfast Unionist MP Stanley
McMaster, in a clearly resigned tone, said that the outcomes of the negotiations at Sunningdale
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were “the only sensible means available to us.” 14 However, when the Communiqué was finally
made public, it appeared that “The fishbone in the gullet for Unionists, even many Faulkner
Unionists, was the idea of a Council of Ireland” and its proposed control over security. 15 Points
thirteen and fifteen of the Communiqué were especially distressing for many Protestants: “the
two parts of Ireland… are inter-dependent in the whole field of law and order, and those security
issues would be jointly handled by the Council of Ireland.” 16 With popular antipathy widespread
throughout Protestant Northern Ireland, less than two months after the new executive took office,
a general election was held that effectively showed that the Sunningdale proposal did not carry
popular Protestant support; the Sunningdale Agreement’s “sprit was effectively dead in
December before the Executive ever took office.” 17 The staunchly anti-Sunningdale UUUC won
over fifty-percent of the vote, whereas the pro-Agreement, or Faulkner Unionists, came away
with a mere thirteen-percent, providing Faulkner with what amounted to a national indictment of
the Sunningdale policies. 18

Uneasy Loyalist Coalescence and the UWC Strike
The collapse of the Sunningdale Communiqué, and thus the new executive seemed
inevitable. It was not, however, passively or peacefully dismantled behind the closed doors of
Stormont. In February 1974, the Ulster Workers’ Council was formed with the goal of
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articulating the political and economic needs of the Protestant working class. In joint
communication with the Ulster Army Council—a centralized command of the major Protestant
paramilitaries—the UWC was considering a general strike as a means of exacting its political
demands. Later that month, the UUUC power trio of Paisley, Craig, and West were accepted to
the Council, and UDA political activist Glen Barr was named UWC chairman. After two months
of discussion between the reluctant politicians, who were more apt to accept less violent means
such as “the unreal and outdated campaign of boycotting Irish goods,” their paramilitary
counterparts finally persuaded the politicians that a province wide general strike was the best
form of protest against the Sunningdale executive.
Though the strike got off to a slow start, on Wednesday, May 15, 1974, with youthful
Tartan street gangs and other, more organized paramilitary forces encouraging men and women
to leave work, by the afternoon of the first day large scale work dismissals were becoming
common place throughout the province, including eight thousand Harland and Wolff employees
and ten thousand industrial workers from Co. Antrim. Within days even moderate, middle class
elements of Unionism began to support the strike organizers, being unwilling to support a
government it now believed to be lacking any real power over the province. There is some
disagreement over how much localized intimidation was taking place throughout the strike 19, but
one thing is certain: the asset that was able to secure a material victory for the strikers was their
control over and subsequent diminishing of Northern Ireland’s electricity supply, especially the
power station of Ballylumford, a region, and an occupation almost completely populated by
19

Violence was uncharacteristically low during the strike. The IRA’s campaign claimed no lives, but they continued
bombing “economic targets” including a hotel in Co. Down. Members of the security forces in Londonderry,
Belfast, and Armagh were also attacked (Anderson, Fourteen May Day, 52). Loyalist activity was primarily limited
to strike related intimidation. However, on the fourth day of the strike Dublin and Monaghan became the targets of
what would turn out to be one of the single largest attacks of the Troubles when the UVF exploded three car bombs
killing twenty-eight civilians, Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 94. There is a great lack of analysis on the political effects of these bombings;
Surprisingly, the Dublin and Monaghan bombs had no direct impact on the political legitimacy of the strike.

44

Protestants. 20 By May 28, Faulkner resigned and the executive fell. In his final statement he
came to the realization that a government “which will command public confidence” should be
constructed in the place of the discredited executive at Stormont. 21
Ideologically the strike was successful because it engendered the mainstays of Protestant
fears over the possibility of constitutional loss of status for Northern Ireland as well as the other
hallmark of Ulster loyalist politics, British betrayal. Throughout the strike the UWC issued a
number of bulletins that emphasized these points. The first bulletin bluntly and articulately spells
out the ideas that the strikers wished to represent: “The real purpose of the Council is to provide
a fig-leaf for the Dublin government which enables them to represent Sunningdale as an antiPartitionist victory, and a step toward a united Ireland.” This is not to mention that the new
government was being executed under the watch of British representatives Merlyn Rees and
Stanley Orm of the Northern Ireland Office (the central institution maintaining communication
between Northern Ireland and Westminster), who were perceived to be acting as “arrogant,
pompous, and badly informed colonial administrators.” 22 This rhetoric was repeated in bulletin
after bulletin, and though the “British as colonizers” theme seemed subtle at first, Prime Minister
Harold Wilson himself would help bolster the image of the mainland British government as
overseers of colonial Ulster when on May 25 he stated the strikers, and thus the Protestant
population supporting them, were “people who spend their lives sponging on Westminster and
British democracy.” 23 Having sacrificed their creature comforts, including visits to local drinking
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establishments—which were forcefully ordered to cease operation on May 16 24—Wilson’s
statements only served to strengthen the resolve of an already disgruntled and entrenched
Protestant population.
The day after the strike ended Paisley issued a fiery statement that demanded the fight
“for a restoration of democratic rule in Ulster” was not over despite the victory achieved during
the stoppage. 25 Fist pounding loyalist epithets like this were hardly surprising coming from
Paisley. What is interesting about this statement is when it was made and what that says about
the relationship between the politicians and the paramilitaries throughout the strike. Paisley was
conspicuously absent for the first days of the strike because he flew to Canada to attend a
funeral, and though he played a more vocal role when he returned, he always preferred talking to
acting. Steve Bruce brilliantly describes the divide between the politicians and the paramilitary
organizers of the strike: “The paramilitaries felt… that the politicians would use them when it
suited them and then reject them once the threat of anarchy had achieved the desired end of
bringing down” the executive. In fact, less than a year later Paisley would accuse his former
paramilitary comrades “of committing crimes ‘just as heinous and hellish as those of the
IRA.’” 26 The early 1970s showed an uneasy but at times almost inseparably necessary
connection between the official political voices and the violent elements of paramilitary
activism, which helped fuel a general acceptance of such forces among the Protestant community
at large.
Dissenting views, however, became apparent almost as soon as the forces of Protestant
loyalism organized under a common banner. Among the largest results of the strike, and thus the
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political trajectory of the unified loyalist bloc, was that it showed that working class constituents
could successfully articulate their own political goals outside the traditional strictures of elite
political representation, in this case being those political leaders in the UUUC such as Craig,
West, and Paisley. 27 Workers’ Association spokesman Boyd Black expressed such sentiments in
an article written less than a month after the strike ended. He began by triumphantly stating,
“The organized working class gently flexed its muscles and discovered it could run the country”;
continuing down a subtly Marxist trajectory he calls for workers in such economic institutions as
the Harland and Wolff Shipyard to take control of the affairs of their work place. The second
main point of Black’s piece was intended to solidify the fact that
The established middle class politicians like Craig, Paisley and West gave their support to
the strike. The strike leadership, however, kept its political independence and it is
important for the future that this independent thinking be maintained and developed. 28
The latent resentment in Boyd’s statement extended to the UDA. In their second anniversary of
the UWC Strike edition of Loyalist News the solidified divisions between working class
paramilitaries and their former political representation was illustrated: “Ian R.K. Paisley… has
repeatedly attacked the paramilitaries for their claim to have a voice in the political life of
Northern Ireland.” Furthermore, the ranting indictments of Paisley’s politicking points out one of
the single largest issues confronting paramilitaries and their associated communities: prisoners’
rights and how to alleviate the hardships of those families effected by imprisonment. 29
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The Emergence of Paramilitary Politics
When the Troubles began, the average prison population in Northern Ireland was six
hundred; by 1979 the population had expanded to three thousand, many of whom were arrested
and prosecuted via juryless Diplock courts for offences related to paramilitary activity.
Furthermore, after the introduction of special category, or political status in 1972, the bulk of
those affiliated with a politically motivated paramilitary organization were housed at the highsecurity Maze Prison, also known as Long Kesh. Before the Westminster government took away
special category status and introduced its criminalization policy in 1976 (to be discussed in more
depth in the final chapter) paramilitary prisoners occupied military style Nissan huts, where they
autonomously engaged in the responsibilities of everyday life and were freely allowed to
maintain their own brands of discipline and ideological practices as well as communicate with
other prisoners. Contact with their families was also readily allotted. It was in those compounds
in the early 1970s that major inter-factional discussions began to take shape between the UVF
and the Official IRA, who were at the time violently feuding with the Provisional IRA (the latter
being the main branch of the IRA that was active in violence throughout the Troubles) over the
future political direction of republicanism. 30 The interactions between the Officials and the UVF
would have a great impact in shaping the working class political initiatives of the UVF’s new
political party, the Volunteer Political Party. The VPP went public in 1974, releasing a party
manifesto that identified its two main platforms of working class deprivation and internment. In
1974, after having its membership request rejected by the UUUC, the VPP began to organize an
independent campaign for its candidate in the upcoming Westminster election in October.
Former UVF internee, Ken Gibson, running in the hotly contested West Belfast constituency
30
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against SDLP leader Gerry Fitt, and popular DUP candidate Johnny McQuade, finished fourth in
the overall vote, gaining just over 2,600 votes, or less than fifteen-percent of the total Protestant
vote. Though numerous commentators debate the reasons for the VPP’s failure, what is apparent
is that by the mid-1970s “the desire for a working-class alternative to unionist parties was quite
sincerely felt.” 31 Urged on by the success of the UWC strike, working class organizations, both
external and internal to paramilitary influences, split from the “corporate ideology of
Orangeism” and blind Unionist unity to forge its own political articulations. 32
In the early 1970s Protestant working class consciousness was developing more rapidly
than it ever had. Many of the organizations were primarily concerned with specific community
issues, such as housing and welfare. Protestant Sandy Row in South Belfast had six such
institutions by 1972. 33 The UDA had been involved in such activities, primarily through their
involvement in the Ulster Community Action Group, an umbrella organization for smaller
groups in North and East Belfast, but the most prominent victory for the UDA and the UVF as
well as the local citizenry was the successful 1974 Save the Shankill campaign, which was aimed
at a proposal to rejuvenate the area. 34 It was essentially feared that the area would lose its
Protestant character and possibly its population through a government proposals aimed at
commercialization: “the Shankill will become a main road… The local shops will be forced out
of business to be replaced by supermarkets.” Also, the proposed motorway construction “means
fewer houses… the Upper Shankill will continue to decline.” 35
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Considering side by side the outcome of the VPP campaign and the organization of
localized political action on behalf of Belfast’s working class Protestants, the nuances and
potential of emerging paramilitary politics can be identified. As pointed out earlier, the first half
of the 1970s saw a general acceptance of street level paramilitary activism in the Protestant
communities generally and working class neighborhoods especially, though their more grotesque
acts of violence never gained widespread support. It was for primarily this reason that grassroots
paramilitary intervention on behalf of working class communities saw the greater levels of
support and success it did. Whereas there was always only a slim chance for the paramilitaries to
enter the sphere of parliamentary politics in Northern Ireland because “Ulster Protestants had an
implicit sense of a division of labour. Politicians did politics and paramilitaries did muscle and
there was little or no enthusiasm for a blurring of the boundaries.” 36

The Issue of UUUC Unity
After the strike the driving power of Protestant parliamentary politics was the UUUC,
which for many supporters must have seemed like a new era of Unionist unity. This is evidenced
by the UUUC’s performance in both the October 1974 Westminster General Election and the
May 1975 convention election, where, embracing all OUP, DUP, VUPP candidates, the new
council took over fifty-percent of the total poll. However, it is clear from the UUUC’s election
materials and independently produced political statements that unity was still only a fleeting
aspiration. The split in the party is most easily seen over the main issue of Northern Ireland’s
future constitutional position and whether or not power-sharing should be included in any
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devolved manifestation of government. 37 In an April 1975 election pamphlet for South Belfast,
UUUC candidate Raymond Jordan, though supporting “the restoration of Democratic local
government,” blatantly stated that power-sharing on any religious grounds was not acceptable. 38
A statement of support for Raymond’s position appeared in the Belfast News Letter months after
the election. The political advertisement clearly states “We do not offer positions in Cabinet to
Republicans; no power-sharing.” 39 However, other prominent UUUC politicians, most notably
William Craig, were advocating for the very power-sharing that so deeply riled majority
Protestant emotion throughout this period. In September 1975, Craig resigned from the Vanguard
Party declaring, “The UUUC have devalued the convention.” Continuing, Craig blatantly
questions Paisley’s policies which “excludes the SDLP” and such “endeavors… have made more
difficult, if not impossible, the establishment of a meaningful Parliament and Government.” 40 It
was after this episode that Craig faded into the background of Protestant politics. The one time
leader of loyalism had become yet another betrayer of the Ulster Protestant people.

Pursuing Peace
The elite political dealings envisioned in the wake of the UWC strike fizzled under the
pressures of extreme violence and the ending of an IRA ceasefire in 1975. The resumption of
violence after the ending of the IRA’s ceasefire exacerbated suspicions between the two primary
parties set to negotiate in the upcoming convention, the UUUC and SDLP, especially in the
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minds of the former group. 41 Parliamentary politics were deadlocked. From the end of UWC
strike to 1977 there were 782 Troubles related deaths, with paramilitaries on both sides of the
sectarian divide being responsible for the vast majority of them. 42 The lofty issues of
constitutional politics took a back seat to the goal ending of violence, and thus reassuring local
security. This phenomenon can be further understood by Co. Armagh’s, Official Unionist, R.H.
Mercer’s observation that there was substantial apathy among loyalist voters. 43 Mercer’s claims
are well founded considering the consistent drop in voter turnout in all elections since 1973,
especially the 1975 Convention election, which dropped approximately eight-percent from its
previous 1973 Assembly election. Even traditionally important local council elections had a tenpercent lower turnout compared to those held in 1973. 44 Perceiving a waning value in democratic
processes, Protestant’s undertook a wide spectrum of political action in order to secure an ending
to the violence.
In mid-August 1976, groups of women were increasingly on the march throughout
Northern Ireland demanding an end to violence after two small children were killed in the
culmination of a car chase between the IRA and the British Army. 45 These marches culminated
in the formation of the Peace People, led by Mrs. Betty Williams and Miss Mairead Corrigan,
and the launching of a massive rally in Belfast on the 22, attended by nearly twenty-five
thousand men, but predominately women, from all over Northern Ireland. At first the movement
seemed to have massive support by most segments of the Ulster population, Catholic and
Protestant alike. In fact, the extreme loyalist Shankill area of West Belfast spearheaded the
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organization of a local peace movement. Leader Mrs. Anne Brown exuded her hopes for the new
movement, saying that it was “the most important development in the Province over the past
seven years. The time has come… to tell the gangsters and thugs to leave us alone.” 46 Ironically,
even the UDA supported the “women of peace,” yet they were quick to point out that the
movement must be weary of “allowing politicians to get on their bandwagon.” 47 Even more
extreme were the accusations that “among their ranks are those backing the Provos” (a short
hand often given to the Provisional IRA). 48 In the end such suspicions seemed to become
widespread in many segments of the Protestant community as aspects of the Peace People’s
ideology detracted from its purely peaceful message and became connected with the political
legitimacy and legal protection of paramilitary activists, allowing old sectarian assumptions and
inter-class disputes within Protestantism to distract from any unified acceptance of the Peace
People. 49
The organization’s publication, Peace by Peace, greatly exhibits the reasons why they
could be viewed as being soft on paramilitaries, and thus disagreeable to the Protestant
community. One article states, “Should we talk to them [the paramilitaries]? Yes… Come and
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join us. We need your energy and commitment.” A further perceivably subversive attempt to
support paramilitary activity was shown in a pamphlet called “Know Your Rights,” which details
a person’s legal rights if they are questioned, searched, or arrested by security forces. 50 Though
explicitly non-sectarian, the Peace People’s brand of populist outreach and their perceived
connection with republican activism would greatly limit their appeal to the Protestant community
outside of working class paramilitary neighborhoods, who faced the same difficulties as their
Catholic counterparts. But even the support of those like Brown’s Shankill branch would not
prove numerous enough to make the Peace People a viable force in the province. By the late
1970’s the provincial influence of the Peace People was already showing signs of splinter when
one of the first regional branches of the organization in Armagh officially broke away to form its
own regionalized movement, though the reasons pointed out were not explicitly sectarian in
nature. 51
The outcry to stop violence was still deeply felt despite the shortcomings of the Peace
People. Representing an opposite approach to the marches of the Peace People was the United
Unionist Action Council strike of 1977, led by Paisley, Official Unionist from Co. Fermanagh,
Earnest Baird, and representatives of the UDA. The basic demands of the UUAC strike were the
implementation of “an effective offensive against the IRA and [a] promise to reinstate fullblooded Unionist rule.” 52 It seems, however, that its outspoken objections to direct rule were
certainly less important than the security issue. The May 1977 strike lasted less than two weeks
and was never supported by the majority of the Protestant population, including those rank-andfile groups who were the primary boons to the successful 1974 UWC strike, such as the Harland
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and Wolff employees, the UVF, and perhaps most importantly, the Ballylumford power station
operators. 53 Also, unlike the 1974 strike, intimidation was the only tool at the strikers’ disposal,
and the irony of a violent strike called to protest violence was not lost on Protestant Northern
Ireland; yet the strike leaders never seemed to publicly admit such an odd miss step. Up to the
last moments of the strike they held firm in their cause: “the strike is about the preservation of
life.” 54
Nonetheless, the strike was a failure. Even though the security situation and the
continuation of violence was at the forefront of Protestant political priorities, the current climate
did not provide fertile grounds for such action compared to 1974, because at the time there was
no real threat to the constitutional position of Protestant’s within the Northern Ireland state.
However drastic the failure of the strike may have seemed, there were no real repercussions for
its primary public leader, Ian Paisley, who was to maintain a massive following in coming
years. 55 What the lack of spontaneous support for the UUAC strike also illustrates was that
militant outbursts of political assertiveness were no longer effective in rallying the support of
large sections of the Protestant population. The late 1970s were certainly a far cry from the
beginning of the decade when the UDA was welcomed to march the streets of Protestant
Northern Ireland and be heralded as its righteous protectors. It also shows that though rejecting
violent loyalism, the political goals of protecting the Protestant constitution of Northern Ireland
from Republican attack, their Southern Irish enemies, and the untrustworthy politicians at
Westminster still held the greatest sway in Ulster Protestant political ideology.
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The Image of Violence
The final years of the 1970s showed a drastic shift in how Protestant Northern Ireland
expressed its loyalist views. No longer did the population at large acquiesce in paramilitary
intervention. In fact, from 1977 to 1979 showed a large drop in violence. Since 1972 at least two
hundred people were killed per year. By the late 1970s this was no longer the case; the total for
the final three-year period of the 1970s recorded 329 Troubles related deaths. Furthermore,
Protestant paramilitaries were operating at a much-reduced level; killing no more than thirty
people in each year from 1977 to1979. Their campaigns were also drastically limited in
geographical reach, recording only a small number of victims outside of Belfast, most notably in
Cos. Armagh and Antrim, areas outside of Belfast heavily targeted by the IRA; 56 Protestant
retaliation in these areas was to be expected. However, the popular notion that there was “little or
no central control over the [Protestant] murder campaign” paired with the sensational
gruesomeness of some of their acts indicated that the Protestant population was turning against
their former paramilitary protectors. 57
Nothing exemplifies the public image of Protestant paramilitarism during this era better
than the actions and convictions of the Shankill Butchers, a group of UVF men lead by Lenny
Murphy, who terrorized the Catholic, Cliftonville area of North Belfast through a series of
kidnappings and tortures that eventually led to the gruesome deaths of nineteen people from
November 1975 to May 1977. In February 1979, numerous members of the Butchers gang were
given a total of forty-two life sentences for what the judge described as “so cruel and so ruthless
as to be beyond the comprehension of any normal person.” 58 The Protestant community was
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becoming more and more fed up with actions such as those carried out by the Shankill Butchers.
However, this was not a period that showed a decline in the political duress of Protestant
Northern Ireland. There was still a strong sense among many Protestants that there lot in Ulster
was slowly being syphoned by republican interests while Westminster turned a blind eye,
making the political scene of this period one of extremes.

Parliamentary Loyalism
Traditional loyalist fears still pervaded, but considering the decline in support for
Protestant paramilitaries and the lack luster turnout of the UUAC strike of 1977, street level
political action was losing traction. Loyalist views were becoming firmly a part of the sphere of
parliamentary politics. Therefore, elections and elite political developments are a good way of
estimating the general thrust of Protestant political motivation in the late 1970s. It should be
remembered, however, that voter turnout was persistently low throughout this period. Many in
the Protestant community shared a sense of hopelessness after nearly ten years of chaos in
Northern Ireland.
The 1977 district council elections encapsulate a major shift that was beginning to occur
in Protestant politics, the rise of major DUP influence. Though they only had a majority on the
Ballymena council, holding eleven of the twenty-one seats, they had a large presence on many of
Northern Ireland’s twenty-six local districts. For instance, they won seven seats on the Belfast
council compared to fifteen for the OUP, which was a drastic change from the last council
elections in 1973, where the DUP only won two seats to the OUP’s twenty-five. Put more
simply, the DUP increased its number of district council seats from twenty-one to seventy-four,
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where the OUP/UUP dropped from 233 to 178. 59 The primary reasons for these changes are that
“Protestant politics were being simplified.” 60 The UUUC had dissolved and the Vanguard
movement was on the verge of collapse. By the 1979, Westminster election former loyalist
bulwark William Craig—merely a symbolic remnant of Vanguard, who rejoined the OUP years
earlier—lost his long time seat to DUP general Peter Robinson, causing Craig to leave politics
and retire. 61 The options for Protestant voters were increasingly between the “hardline unionism”
of the DUP and the more moderate OUP. Moreover, the appeal of the DUP can be explained
because they were able to blend their uncompromising constitutional positions with populist
economic and social positions, gaining them ground among those who followed traditional
Ulster Protestant views on the nature of the state and their favored place within it. Working class
Protestants, whose politics, though motivated by abstract constitutional issues, would have also
had material economic interests in the more left hinting economic policies of the DUP. 62
However, the divide between the OUP and the DUP was far from drastic in many ways.
This can be glimpsed from the views both parties presented on European Economic Community
membership. OUP leader, James Molyneaux, stated in 1978 “it is bad enough to be peripheral to
the British economy. It is much worse to be peripheral to a British economy which is itself a
peripheral region of the European economy.” 63 Whereas Paisley, justifying his thoughts with a
similar logic to Molyneaux’s, bluntly said “our Europe policies are clear—we want out.” 64 It is
here that it becomes clear that even though the OUP and the DUP were competing for similar
political support, Protestant politics in general clearly favored the return of at least some degree
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of local autonomy. Under threat from outside forces, Europe in this case, both of the main
Protestant political representative bodies were clamoring to maintain a secure, isolated Ulster.
The culmination of such anti-European involvement culminated in the 1979 European
Parliament elections that were certainly fought within Northern Ireland on traditional sectarian
extremes. In the end, three were elected, including Paisley, who took nearly thirty-percent of the
total vote, SDLP leader, John Hume, won twenty-five percent of the pole, and the OUP’s John
Taylor found himself in with a further eleven percent of the vote. Longtime Alliance Party leader
Oliver Napier finished fifth in the poll with a mere seven percent of the vote. 65 The election was
promoted within Protestant circles as a fight “against the forces of reaction, republicanism, and
revolution.” 66 Outside of the normal fear mongering characteristically associating the moderate
nationalist SDLP with violent republicanism, what is informative about the above statement was
that Molyneaux made it. During a time when Protestant politics seemed more clearly divided
than ever he made a statement that could’ve riled both DUP and OUP constituencies.
Molyneaux’s political prominence at this time is further evidence of the institutionalized
uncompromising radicalism that was pervasive in Protestant politics since the beginning of the
Troubles, though without the violent undertones of enlisting paramilitary action.
Often noted for his droll “pedestrian style and lack of charisma” compared to his main
political opponent, Paisley, Molyneaux won over the moderate Protestant vote for a number of
reasons, including his notable support for a new, albeit gradual devolution scheme which would
provide the framework for Northern Ireland to gain “back control of major local government
services.” 67 By the time he officially became the head of the OUP in 1979, he already gained the
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reputation for defying the will of Westminster and invoking the voice and will of his constituents
by forcing “useful concessions to Ulster.” 68 In summation, the growing dualism within Protestant
parliamentary politics can be viewed as a contrast between the gradual, understated approaches
of Molyneaux and the OUP, whose constituents had resigned themselves to “direct rule as a
basic framework of governance,” whereas the “bombastic excesses” of the DUP and its
supporters were always quick to be on the attack in its negative assertions against the British
government. Constitutionally, however, the goals of these two branches had similar aims. 69 By
the end of the 1970s a malaise had settled over Protestant Northern Ireland. Political responses
had shifted away from violence, though the core tenants of reactionary ethnic loyalism and a
hopeless distrust of their political master’s in Westminster were deeply entrenched in the
Protestant political mind after nearly a decade of complete upheaval.
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Chapter Three: Political Hinterland, 1980-1985
“I was nineteen when I went in. They gave me the uniform and I said I’d rather go naked.
I was duly assaulted… They put me on solitary for thirty-five days and beat me black and blue…
I developed an obsessive hatred for screws [prison guards].” These statements made by a loyalist
paramilitary prisoner are shockingly similar to those made by other former prisoners who were
housed in the H-Block compounds during the period known as “criminalisation.” In brief,
criminalization lasted from 1976 to1981 and refers to a set of prison policies that sought to
remove political credibility from those convicted of paramilitary related activity in an attempt to
represent their actions as a “criminal conspiracy.” 1Though guards used physical violence against
loyalist and republican prisoners as a way of demeaning the individuals’ value within the prison,
stripping paramilitaries of their special category status and all the privileges encompassed by that
status was the other primary aim of criminalisation. The elimination of special category status
materially affected prisoners in the following ways: desegregating the various paramilitary
factions, moving them from their compound style Nissan huts to individual cells on mixed
blocks—inter-factional violence would become an increasingly common occurrence—forcing
paramilitary prisoners to wear prison uniforms instead of their civilian clothing, participating in
prison work became mandatory, and greatly limiting outside correspondence and visitation, if not
completely taking it away.
Criminalisation and the removal of special category status lead to a wave of protest by
paramilitary prisoners on both sides of the sectarian divide, culminating with the 1981 IRA
hunger strikes. Likewise, it is one of the main contentions of this chapter that the ’81 hunger
strikes specifically, but all forms of organized prisoner protest in general, fundamentally altered
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the political scene of Northern Ireland throughout the 1980s. Not only did the hunger strikes
launch the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Féin, into the sphere parliamentary politics, but also
loyalist paramilitaries, through their actions inside and outside of the prison system, became a
more elaborated political entity, defining their political ideologies outside of the contexts of
traditional Unionist and loyalist Protestant political bodies. Also, in the 1980s the political voices
of the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party became enthralled by a near
complete acceptance of loyalist ideology as the Thatcher lead UK government began to earnestly
engage in diplomacy with the Republic of Ireland without the consent of Protestant Northern
Ireland. But before explicating the contours of Protestant political developments in regards to
Anglo-Irish relations, a detailed discussion of prison protest and the divisive political responses
within the Protestant community will be undertaken.

Paramilitary Prisoner Protest
It was established in the previous chapter that the greatly expanded prison population was
a major issue for many working class Protestant families. Whereas the focus in chapter two was
on grassroots organizations on the outside, such as the Loyalist Prisoner Association, this chapter
will concentrate on protest efforts from within the prisons and how they extended beyond the
prison walls to inform the greater politics of Northern Ireland. Kieran McEvoy discusses the
“collective resistance projects” of the specific loyalist and republican organizations in terms of
their efforts to represent themselves as unified, politically motivated groups and not individual
offenders, which the criminalisation policy sought to instill, thus undermining the legitimacy of
paramilitary organizations. McEvoy highlights the complex history of paramilitary prisoner
protest throughout the Troubles, but it is clear from his study that after nearly five years of
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criminalisation both loyalist and republican paramilitaries undertook protest efforts with more
fervent determination. The most common forms of protest were the blanket protest and the dirty
protest: the former involved a refusal to wear prison issued uniforms and donning only blankets.
In efforts to further challenge the prison regime, the dirty protest included a refusal to bathe and
urinating and defecating in one’s cell. Often times the two forms of protest went hand in hand,
however, loyalists did not undertake the dirty protest at first because there was a fear amongst
the leadership on the outside that “emulating the Republicans” could undermine loyalist
legitimacy.
From the blanket and dirty protests of the late 1970s and early 1980s developed a more
self-destructive but effective form of protest: the hunger strike; the first of which was started by
republicans in October of 1980, but in December six UDA men joined. 2 As the name suggests,
the hunger strike involved depriving oneself of all nutrition, often time with the exception of
water and possibly salt tablets to help keep the water ingested. By 1981 the effects of the 1980
strike were waning despite its drastic implications. And again, on March 1, Bobby Sands, Officer
Commanding of the IRA inside the H-Blocks, went on hunger strike, and on May 5, he would be
the first of ten men to die, but not before being elected to the Westminster parliament. 3 Because
of their looser organization and lack of ideological drive, loyalist prisoners are often times said to
be less effective at such forms of protest than their republican counterparts; 4 however true such
statements may be, loyalist paramilitary activists nonetheless saw the possible political capital
that such actions afforded republicans and loyalists alike.
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UVF member turned political leader David Ervine stated, “Criminalization… set the
cause of peace back many, many years. Whilst one was conscious that your enemy [the IRA]
was starving themselves to death, the cause upon which that enemy travelled, if you like, was a
just one.” 5 Likewise, former UWC chairman and UDA member, Glen Barr, somewhat hesitantly
admitted, “They had a cause and they fought for it, and I have always had a sneaking admiration
for them because of what they were prepared to endure for what they believed in… I also think
that it was probably the single most unifying fact for the Nationalist population.” 6 Taken
together these two statements illustrate a major issue for Protestant paramilitaries that would
develop throughout the 1980s within the Protestant community; namely, a creeping need within
the grassroots paramilitary ranks to develop a coherent political ideology. This need was
engendered because elite Protestant politicians were increasingly viewed as being dismissive of
the needs of the working class, paramilitary, communities they supposedly represented.

Loyalist Paramilitary Politics after the Hunger Strikes
Mainstream Protestant discourse exemplifies this class divide. An article published in the
moderate loyalist, and always religiously zealous, Orange Standard read, “Christians and
churches will have to come clean on their relationships to terrorists, revolutionaries, and hunger
strikers.” 7 The Protestant Telegraph takes up a similar discursive line when, after the fallout
from the second hunger strike had begun to take hold, stated that those who support the cause of
restoring political status “stand condemned before God and man. Ulster would be better off
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without them.” 8 These two statements are revealing in their vagueness, as neither of them
directly mentioned loyalist paramilitary attitudes towards political status, who, as pointed out
above, were in favor of the restoration of political status. In an article published following Sinn
Féin’s competent showing in the 1985 local council elections, where they received twelvepercent of the total vote and fifty-nine seats throughout the province, 9 the UVF’s publication,
Combat, exclaimed
It is now painfully clear that the main parties such as the Official Unionist Party and the
Democratic Unionist Party have made no progress over the past couple of years… How
long will it be before we find them exploiting the fears of our people… The grass-roots
loyalist must now say enough is enough. 10
What did such deeply sincere statements amount to? Since the utter failure of the VPP,
discussed in chapter two, the UVF organized another political party in 1977, called the
Progressive Unionist Party, which ironically supported a non-sectarian, cross-class form of
socialism that would not find traction in the loyalist community until after the 1994 ceasefires. 11
And despite founding member Hughie Smyth’s large Shankill following, the political aims of the
PUP did not travel well. The party saw only dismal support in the 1981 local council election. 12
On the other hand, fairing only slightly better than the UVF, the UDA set out to not only
develop a succinct political program throughout the 1980s, but they were also committed to
developing a deeply informed ideology that, it was hoped, could be adopted by many loyalists,
thus giving greater credence to the ethnic claims of their Protestant Ulster heritage. Prominent
political scientist, Alan Finlayson, in a discussion on the nationalistic tendencies of Ulster
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loyalism points to attempts by loyalists to build a historically based sense of the specificity of the
Ulster Protestant people, further serving to reinforce their claim to Northern Ireland and its
connection with the UK. 13 Likewise, many scholars have related this point to the ideological
endeavors of the UDA throughout the 1980s, specifically through their adoption of Dr. Ian
Adamson’s “Cruithin” mythology. Adamson, himself a committed member of the OUP,
published two studies in the early 1980s that claimed Ulster was originally colonized by the
Cruithin people, descendants of Scottish Picts. Only when invaded by southern Irish Gaels were
they forced to retreat to modern day Argyll, in Scotland. During the seventeenth century
Plantation of Ireland, where Catholic lands, primarily in the North, were confiscated and
redistributed to British, mainly Scottish Presbyterian, planters did the descendants of the
Cruithin, and thus the rightful claimants of Ulster, regain their homeland. Though the credibility
of the Cruithin account has been debated and questioned, its importance was nonetheless valid
for the UDA, who were trying to connect a sense of historical legitimacy to their emerging
political goals outside of the traditional Protestant cultural strictures that were rooted in the
Glorious Revolution of the late seventeenth century as embodied by the Orange Order.
Moreover, by separating from the traditional justifications of Protestant loyalism, the UDA could
further distance itself from the political influences of politicians like Paisley. 14
Delving into the ancient roots of Eire also allowed the UDA to construct an ideological
profile that was both antithetical and common to the Catholic and republican cultural
mythological constructions of Northern Ireland. The imagery and symbolism associated with
13
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Cúchullain—the hound of Ulster, who defended the Northern province against western Irish
invaders as depicted in the eighth century’s Táin Bó Cúailinge 15— supported the UDA’s claim to
historical legitimacy, but it also provided Ulster Protestants with a connection to the Catholic
community that was less overtly combative than the fundamental Protestantism of Paisley
because it was rooted in a common tradition. However, the proposed ancient Ulster mythology of
Adamson did not catch on with the majority of Protestant Northern Ireland, favoring as they did
the Orange tradition of the seventeenth century. Similarly, the proposed parallelism with the
Catholic community discouraged many rank-and-file Protestants from adopting such cultural
symbols as the Cruithin, who, from the artwork presented in Adamson’s work, appeared to be
exceptionally Gaelic in appearance. 16 Nonetheless, the leadership of the UDA was deeply
committed to developing a uniform cultural identity for Protestant Northern Ireland in hopes of
legitimating their political initiatives.
In the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the UDA formed of the Ulster Political
Research Group, whose membership included notable UDA men like commander Andy Tyrie,
Belfast political figure Tommy Little, and Ulster Freedom Fighters commander John
McMichael. The group was intent on formulating an articulate and plausible political structure
for a future Northern Ireland government. In January of 1987, the UPRG published the fruits of
its labors, Common Sense. In brief, Common Sense proposed a devolved government—
independent from the UK—whose parliament was to be elected by proportional representation,
the production of a written constitution to be discussed and produced via a constitutional
convention, a bill of rights, and a supreme court to “safeguard the rights of the individual.”
Within this framework, as the document claims, Protestant loyalists could resolve their
15
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suspicions about Ulster Catholics and their hopes of a united Ireland because by allowing
Catholics to “play a full role” in the governance of Northern Ireland; Protestants would no longer
“feel compelled to defend the frontier.” 17 These last statements point to an important idea that
undergirds Common Sense and were therefore extremely consequential of to the UPRG’s
chairman John McMichael and his existence outside of the political think-tank. As the leader of
the UFF, the UDA’s military wing, McMichael subtly weaves into Common Sense a loyalist
logic that implies that if Catholics gave up their dream of a united Ireland, and thus abandoned
their support of the IRA, than militant Protestants too could cease their violent actions. In
essence, Common Sense blended notions of the specificity of the Ulster Protestant identity and
loyalist defensiveness. However insightful and appealing Common Sense seemed, it failed to
persuade any significant portion of the Protestant community, despite claiming initial praise by
prominent politicians such as SDLP leader John Hume and prominent Unionist Frank Millar. 18
In summation, if the VPP represents a failed experiment in the mid-1970s, what the organization
of the PUP and the publication of Common Sense show was that while still only negligible
forces, paramilitaries were committed to formulating political programs completely outside the
strictures of traditional Protestant politics. But their public association with gruesome violence
and crime would hinder their success as parliamentary forces. Looking at the level and type of
violence associated with the paramilitaries throughout the 1980s reveals the validity of public
perceptions about Protestant paramilitary violence, and thus the problems faced by Protestant
paramilitaries when trying to legitimate their political actions.
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Changing Paramilitary Violence
It was previously established in chapter two that beginning in 1977 loyalist killings were
becoming much less common. For instance, from 1972 to 1976 loyalists were responsible for
594 deaths, but from 1977 to 1987 they were responsible for 117, with the years immediately
following the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, ’86 and ’87, showing a slight upsurge. 19
Though these statistics show a clear downward trend in loyalist violence, what accounts for such
a trend? Again, a point from chapter two is relevant here: the extreme violence of the
paramilitaries was no longer an acceptable force for political change for most in the Protestant
community due to the fact that loyalist violence was increasingly associated with mindlessness
and gangsterism. The statistics relating to the types of incidents in which loyalist paramilitaries
were responsible for also illustrates this point to a large degree. The Catholic community was
still the main target of Protestant paramilitary action, killing sixty-two Catholic civilians from
1980 to 1987. However, there was a proportionately higher number of non-sectarian killings.
Killings associated with petty-revenge on other Protestants, criminal enterprises, or internecine
feuding were becoming more common. Mark Rosborough was severely beaten and shot when a
UVF gang accosted him on the evening of February 16, 1985, in revenge for an altercation that
took place in 1979. Another Protestant victim of UVF violence was civilian Samuel Lawrence,
who was attacked during a robbery on April 3, 1987. Finally, throughout the 1980s the UDA and
the UVF were involved in murders of its own members or those of the other organization, and
though violent feuding was nothing new to the Protestant paramilitaries, many of the attacks in
the 1980s were driven by the fear of possible informers both within the organizations, and within
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the communities at large. 20 Considering the previous discussion on paramilitary attempts at
political articulation, what these statistics and instances show is that there was a clear divide
between the political goals of Protestant paramilitarism and the rank-and-file member, that latter
group greatly exacerbating general public fears about paramilitary violence. The outcome of
such a relationship certainly contributed to the political failures of both the UVF and the UDA,
but this was not an idea that was lost on each organizations command structures.
In the 1980s the UVF increasingly used the nom de guerre Protestant Action Force to
claim some of its more overtly sectarian killings. From the 1974 to 1975 eight people were killed
by the PAF, but from 1982 into the early1990s they claimed twenty victims. 21 The use of a
pseudonym, as we have seen with the, as of 1992, legal UDA was a tactic that could afford or
possibly hinder political credibility. This is especially true pertaining to the UVF’s political
wing, the PUP, which was becoming a larger but still un-tried public voice for the violent
organization. The UDA itself, as has already been hinted at, was reconsidering the relationship
between its political and military roles throughout the 1980s. Common Sense implicitly balanced
the current need for militant action with the promise of constructive political discussion once
IRA operations ceased, but the need to assert a strong military presence within a productive
political plan was a constant theme in Protestant paramilitary rhetoric throughout the 1980s. 22 In
an interview for the Guardian in 1981 Tyrie was reported to have demanded proscription for the
UDA in order to bolster their political credibility. Furthermore, in 1983 there were rumors that
the UDA was to form an elite military branch called the Ulster Defence Force. UDF founder, and
Common Sense architect, McMichael stated that though a political solution was preferable,
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The policy of the UDA remains the same, we condemn people who get into sectarian
killings. But we wouldn’t condemn those who conduct a calculated, controlled campaign
against republican terrorists who are themselves engaged in a war against the Protestant
community. 23
The UDF was finally established in 1985. It never became the elite unit it was initially
envisioned as, however, the program did provide more sophisticated military style training to
many of the UDA’s more ruthless recruits, such as Johnny Adair, who would rise to prominence
in the 1990s. 24 The balance between violence and politics sought after by both the UVF and
UDA was a partial response to the parliamentary success of Sinn Féin after the 1981 hunger
strikes because as they showed, violence alone would not cast the fate of the Troubles. Outside
the realm of paramilitary activism, the IRA’s “armalite and ballot box” strategy inspired great
fear for many in the Protestant community.

Unionist Responses to Sinn Féin
The 1981 hunger strikes provided the IRA with massive political legitimation. Their
political stock was further solidified when a Westminster By-Election was held in April over the
contested seat of Fermanagh/South Tyrone created by the death of Unionist Frank Maguire.
Hunger striker Bobby Sands, leading a campaign from his cell after over a month without
nutrition, beat hardline Unionist Harry West by over fourteen hundred votes. Protestants
exhibited various shades of dismal defeat. European MP John Taylor, showing initial satisfaction
at the high percentage of Protestant voter turnout in favor of West, resigned himself to the reality
that “The vote for Sands shows that 90 percent of the Roman Catholics in the constituency are
sympathetic to the Provisional IRA.” He continued, “The question Protestants throughout Ulster
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are now asking is whether this result is representative of Roman Catholic opinion elsewhere
throughout the Province.” Exemplifying further Unionist distress, an unnamed Unionist from
Enniskillin asked, “Just where were the moderate Roman Catholics who have issued statements
of condemnation of the killing of Protestant members of the security forces.”
The IRA’s successful foray into parliamentary politics would continue after Sands’ death
in May, when Owen Carron, Anti-H Block representative, won the seat vacated by Sands,
defeating his Official Unionist opponent by over twenty-two hundred votes. 25 Sinn Féin’s initial
electoral success in 1981 boosted the vote for the DUP and other loyalist groupings. The DUP,
for the first time, took the majority of the popular vote by a very slim margin of 26.6 percent
versus 26.5 percent for the Ulster Unionist Party, however, other loyalists achieved a further 6.6
percent of the vote, giving the self-proclaimed hardliners a clear majority. This majority, though
close, was visible in many district councils, such as the Ballymena district where the DUP
increased its majority over the OUP from eleven seats in 1977 to thirteen of the twenty-one
available seats in 1981. Furthermore, the DUP took control of the Antrim council for the first
time in eight years. It is also important to note that though the OUP lost ground to the DUP in the
council elections, their overall showing was very strong, and the primary loser was the more
moderate Alliance Party who lost 5.5 percent of their 1977 vote and a total of thirty-two council
positions in 1981.
The electoral politics of Northern Ireland were extremely polarized. Protestants were
increasingly turning toward candidates who they believed would unflinchingly devote
themselves to the defense of the Northern Ireland state. 26 Steve Bruce suggests that the rise in the
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DUP vote over the OUP was a result of Sinn Féin’s entrance into politics, in turn suggesting that
the DUP was the firm leader of Protestant loyalism. Although he later credits the unifying
causation of 1985’s Anglo-Irish Agreement between the two main Protestant parties, 27 it is clear
that by the early 1980s segments within the OUP were taking up the mantle of the loyalist
defenders of Ulster Protestants. Shortly after the ’81 council election Armagh MP Harold
McCusker met with thirty-nine councilors from the border areas of South Tyrone, Newry and
Mourne, Armagh, and South Down to draw support for the strongly loyalist “Frontier
Proclamation” that exclaimed
We will never accept absorption into an All-Ireland Republic and neither the
blandishments of Dublin or the economic and political pressure from London will coerce
us out of our birthright. We are met together because we believe it is only the motivation,
discipline and strength which our community gives us that will enable our Party to save
our Province. 28

Changing British Responses
Protestant loyalist entrenchment in the early 1980s was only partially due to anxieties
inspired by Sinn Féin’s electoral success. Concurrently, British disengagement with Northern
Ireland became more widely perceived. After years of practice the new security policy, known as
“Ulsterization,” began to show Ulster Protestants that their safety and political legitimacy was
becoming less important to mainland Britain. Briefly, the policy of “Ulsterization” called for a
decreased role for the British Army in favor of the expansion of the roles of the Royal Ulster
Constabulary and the Ulster Defense Regiment—a regiment of the British Army manned entirely
by Northern Ireland citizens. In effect the UDR was a symbolic and literal replacement for the
Ulster Special Constabulary and former B-Specials, though the actions of the UDR have never
27
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been associated with the high levels of sectarianism as their forerunners. By the 1980s the effects
of “Ulsterization” were clear: the RUC ranks were expanded from five thousand in 1976 to over
twelve thousand by 1982 in order to compensate for their new “high-risk profile”—the wording
used in “The Way Ahead”, the report issued by the Northern Ireland Office that suggested
“Ulsterization.” The UDR’s ranks were likewise expanded to seven thousand, the largest the
force had been since the height of the Troubles in 1972. Furthermore, British forces in the
province had been nearly halved from just over twenty-two thousand in 1972 to approximately
ten thousand by the 1980s. 29
The cost of life aptly reflects this shift in security personnel. With the exception of 1979
and 1982, the number of RUC, RUC reserve officers, and UDR deaths greatly outnumbered
those of the British Army. Oppositely the only years previous to “Ulsterization” in which local
security forces were killed in larger numbers than the British Army were 1970—when two
security force fatalities occurred in the whole year—and 1975. 30 A partial explanation for these
statistics was the rise in prison officer assassinations carried out by republican groups following
the policy of “criminalisation.” 31 However, the perception of the situation was clear for Northern
Protestants: the UK was becoming more willing to distance itself from Northern Ireland’s
political situation.
More ideologically ominous for the Protestant community was UK Prime Minister’s,
Margaret Thatcher, growing diplomatic relations with the Republic of Ireland. In the spring of
1981, Thatcher met with the Republic of Ireland’s Taoiseach, Charles Haughey. The interactions
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between the two leaders were not received well by the Protestant community due to the fact that
the details of their talks were not made public. Distrust of the Republic was never in short
supply, but after the Thatcher, Haughey talks even the pro-Union, Conservative PM was
beginning to be viewed with suspicion in Northern Ireland. Armagh’s Church of Ireland Rector,
Cannon Mortimer, expressed general Protestant views: “Many will accept Mrs. Thatcher’s
assurances about the constitutional position of the Province–but why should she not spell out the
details of the conversation and thus remove the suspicion and fears that are being manipulated.”
The manipulations Rector Mortimer spoke of were those of the DUP in trying to stir militancy
within the Protestant community, not only in reaction to the inter-governmental talks, but also in
reference to the hunger strikes and the election of Bobby Sands, all of which, “caused the
polarisation in the community as acute as at any time since the troubles began.” 32
In a further attempt by Paisley and the DUP to build a controlled militant force of
Protestant loyalists committed to the defense of Ulster, outside of the ranks of independently
minded paramilitaries, he and Peter Robinson organized a series of clandestine meetings and
marches that took place at night but certainly within ear shot of the surrounding communities
they were held in. Robinson described the final of three physical “shows of strength” that took
place in the opening days of April at Gortin Glen, Co. Tyrone, and Newry, Co. Armagh as being
“a first step in phase Three of the campaign against the Dublin summit talks.” Though astutely
described as DUP “sabre-rattling,” the implied threat was being made clear. In direct response to
Thatcher’s secrecy, loyalism would respond in order “to resist what is called the Dublin
conspiracy;” resistance could mean violence, and necessary action would continue, “some of it in
public, some not public.” Though being contemporarily condemned by many Unionists,
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including Armagh MP, Harold McCusker, DUP loyalism was responding, however hollowly,
with the threat of militancy. 33
By November 1981, renewed talks between the Republic and the UK were underway,
and despite their innocently conceived motives, 34 the DUP organized a renewed loyalist
response; this time under the guise of the oft threatened Third Force, a unionist sanctioned
paramilitary force directly under the control of Protestant political leaders, harkening back to the
original formation of the UVF in 1912 in response to a renewed Home Rule crisis. In a massive
rally held at Newtownards, Co. Down, Paisley again levied the threat of violence, stating “This
force will defend the defenceless with every weapon at its disposal. If they have legally-held
guns they will use them”. The threat was made all the more sinister by the presence of thousands
of men fully clad in military fatigues and balaclavas, ceremoniously presenting their firearms’
permits. 35 The importance of Paisley’s threatened attempts at organizing a more trustworthy
paramilitary group, as compared to the UDA and UVF, is that though they may have only
amounted to gestures, an undercurrent of extra-parliamentary extremism was still a persistent
ideological influence for Protestant Northern Ireland. Furthermore, outside such rhetorical
showings, the DUP’s political assertiveness, paired with those more loyalist OUP members, were
perceivably correct in their characterization of the more moderate segments of the OUP who
were increasingly seen as “even weaker and more faithless than they were in the sixties and
seventies” when they were originally thought to have betrayed Ulster Protestants. 36 No doubt
such comments were meant to recall the actions of O’Neill and pro-Sunningdale Unionists like
Brian Faulkner. The proclamations of the McCusker lead border Unionists and the DUP’s
33
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shadowy attempts to organize militant segments of Protestant Northern Ireland represent a
precursor to Protestant responses to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. However,
considering the negative reactions within the Protestant community to the DUP’s violent threats,
Protestant responses to the emergence of Anglo-Irish relations also point to one of the main
tensions within Protestant Northern Ireland that would surface after 1985 in regards to how, and
at what levels violence could be applied in protest of the Agreement.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Spectrum of Protestant Reaction
After years of sporadic discussion between Thatcher, Fitzgerald, and various government
representatives, the two executives signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement on November 15, 1985
after Sinn Féin startled the executives into action after the 1983 Westminster General Election,
where former prisoner and IRA political strategist Gerry Adams won the West Belfast seat,
paired with their successful 1985 local council election campaign discussed above. The
Hillsborough Castle signing was symbolic and ironic because it was the site of English power in
Northern Ireland and thus the supposed supporters of the Protestant cause in the Province, but
much like Sunningdale, Protestant voices were overlooked throughout the negotiations of the
Agreement. 37 The first objective of the Agreement was to ensure the Protestant community by
forthrightly announcing the secure place of the Northern Ireland state as a part of the United
Kingdom, but from there Ulster Protestants found little else to feel encouraged about. Article two
set up the Intergovernmental Conference, which would be “concerned with Northern Ireland and
with relations between the two parts of' the island of Ireland, to deal, as set out in this
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Agreement, on a regular basis with political matters; security and related matters; legal matters;
including the administration of justice; the promotion of cross-border co-operation.” The
Conference would be consistently related in Protestant rhetoric as a form of “joint sovereignty.”
The Protestant response was uncompromising in its rejection of the Agreement. 38 J.W.
McAuley’s micro-study of a Protestant enclave in East Belfast neatly shows what he refers to as
the general “‘hardening’ of positions” following the signing of the Agreement. In a presentation
of survey data, McAuley concludes that among both Official and Democratic shades of
Protestant Unionism the “Justifiable actions to defend the British way of life in Northern Ireland”
(implying in this case the ending of the Agreement and its cross-border components) was
showing a willingness to adopt more extreme measures. Out of the more violent options,
including “Civil Disobedience, Protest Marches, Strikes, Rioting, Armed Conflict, and Civil
War,” respondents from both parties showed a marked increase in all categories between 1985–
1986. 39 Protestants outside of the staunchly loyalist East Belfast also implemented a wide range
of extreme responses in protest of the Agreement.
Defying parliamentary and legal processes was among the most popular forms of protest
Protestant officials implemented. “We’re talking about an Ulster that Britain could not govern”
through the proposed “resignation of all 18 unionist MP’s from Westminster,” as well as “the
withdrawal of assemblymen and councilors.” The response was much the same on the local
level. District councils throughout the Province were brought to a standstill as both Official
Unionists and Democratic Unionists voted to end council hearings. Protestant politicians Tom
Black and Jim Speers lead such a protest in Armagh district council, justifying their actions in
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terms of a perceived loss of equality and democratic processes for the people of Northern
Ireland. Other minor boards including Armagh’s Southern Education and Library Board also saw
Protestant walkouts. 40
Minor extra-legal activity was also used as a means to show anti-Agreement clamor. The
persistently level headed MP Harold McCusker, whose burgeoning loyalism has already been
discussed, found himself in jail over his failure to pay his automobile licensing tax. He
responded to his imprisonment as such: “Since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement I have
consistently rejected violence… not only because it invariably damages our own community, but
because I believed there was a more effective alternative. That alternative is to deny the
Stormont Castle regime moral authority,” achieved through the “withholding of all revenue
within my control.” 41 And though the joint unionist leadership of Official Unionist leader, James
Molyneaux, and Ian Paisley “could not rule out the possibility of violence” they both maintained
that such action was not sought. 42 The threat of violent chaos was to stay at the center of
Protestant debate over anti-Agreement action in the years to come. Nearly a year after the
signing of the Agreement, Unionist MP William Ross said “In the coming weeks the Unionist
people will have to make a simple stark choice between the course of civil disobedience or allow
the slow slide into violence.” 43
Organized civil disobedience, verging on widespread street violence was implemented to
a large degree. A week after the singing of the Agreement, Protestants throughout the province
participated in a mass protest in Belfast. Armagh Orangemen rallied their members to join the
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protest; they even arranged public bus transportation to the capital city for those who wished to
participate. 44 In November 1986, there was a similar protest was organized. Approximately
300,000 men and women from around the province participated. In full regalia, Orangemen from
Armagh gathered at Orange Halls throughout the County in preparation to join in a march
through the streets of Belfast but not before burning effigies of Fitzgerald and Thatcher. Minor
street violence, the smashing of storefront windows, and looting occurred before departure.
Presumably unaware of such activity one person said “it was the most sight I have ever
witnessed in my life, even better than any Twelfth. The Armagh loyalists behaved like perfect
gentlemen and was happy to be one of their numbers.” 45 Earlier that year, in March, a general
strike was called, though neither the goals nor the effects of the day long strike were anything
near the levels of the 1974 UWC strike. However, major cities throughout the province including
Cookstown, Co. Tyrone, Magherafelt, Londonderry, and Knockloughgrim, Co. Londonderry
were all but completely shut down by the strike. Reports of intimidation were rampant, but
violence was generally limited to rioting and small skirmishes between the police and loyalist
gangs. 46 Whether through localized political action, such as those of McCusker and innumerous
local councilors, or mass public protest, anti-Agreement action was universal not only in its
practice but also in its accepted implementation of extra-parliamentary practices.
Protestant paramilitary action also increased in response to the Agreement’s
implementation, claiming five victims in 1985 compared to thirty-seven in the two years
following, 47 but considering the previously discussed Common Sense, and its relation to the
political legitimacy of violent action, it appeared as though the paramilitaries were beginning to
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understand that a purely military victory could not be had; political initiative was needed.
Considering the nature and effectiveness of Protestant anti-Agreement activity, Graham
Walker’s conclusions are relevant. He primarily emphasizes its “incoherence,” both in terms of
its understood goals and methods. The only clear aim of this era of protest was that Protestant
Northern Ireland wanted to see the ending of the Anglo-Irish Agreement’s implementation, a
notion embodied by the common slogan “Ulster Says No.” 48 Despite the inarticulateness of antiAgreement action, Protestants’ sense of their institutional place within Northern Ireland was
greatly and perhaps inalterably altered after its implementation.

An Odd Legacy
Protestant protest in response to an institutionalized peace settlement, such as the
Sunningdale Communiqué, is no surprise, but what made the Anglo-Irish Agreement so
unpalatable was that it divided Protestant state authorities in a way previously unrealized.
Outside of the general proposition of the Agreement that sought to implement a cooperative
cross-border institution comparable to Sunningdale’s Council of Ireland, issues of imposed legal
changes and security realignment were viewed as particularly revolting to Ulster Protestant. Not
only did the Agreement contend to “set in hand a programme of work to be undertaken by the
Commissioner of the Garda Siochána [the Republic of Ireland’s police force] and the Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but also, “the object in particular of making the
security forces more readily accepted by the nationalist community” through “action to increase
the proportion of members of the minority in the Royal Ulster Constabulary.” 49 The RUC, whose
relationship with the loyalist community had become very strained throughout the Troubles, was
48
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now looked upon as yet another disloyal entity that would see and indeed contribute to the
destruction of the Protestant Northern Ireland state.
Journalist Chris Ryder’s work on the RUC holds at its core the argument that the force
had always been more impartial and less sectarian than many sources have suggested,
particularly after 1985. He points out that the especially riotous summer marching season of
1985 saw the RUC arrest and charge 468 loyalists versus only 427 republicans. Such a statistic
contributes to the Protestant perception that after the implementation of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement the RUC were viewed as “tools of Dublin,” especially when considering the issue of
parading and the forces commitment to reducing tensions between its historically negative
perceptions in the Catholic community. 50 In 1986 relationships between Catholics, Protestants,
and the RUC were perfectly exemplified in early July when the RUC announced that Twelfth
marches would be rerouted if they tried marching down the nationalist Obins Street in
Portadown, Co. Armagh. In response, Paisley stated, “For decades such parades passed off
peacefully and without incident but if any government, especially one that is doing the bidding of
our Dublin enemies, seeks to deny Ulsterman their inalienable rights then it is heaping trouble
upon its own head.” 51 In efforts to protect an alienated Catholic minority, the RUC was
oppositely alienating the Protestant community, who believed that marching along traditional
routes was not only a right but a historically derived assertion of the values of Orangeism.
However, Protestants’ place within the institutional and social structures of a post-Agreement
Northern Ireland only represents a portion their complex and shifting relationship with the RUC.
It must be remembered that the vast majority of the RUC was, and had always been,
crewed almost entirely by Protestant men and women. These individuals were surely influenced
50
51

Chris Ryder, The RUC, 1922-2000: A Force Under Fire (London: Methuen, 2000), 324-5.
“Paisley Says Parades Must Go On,” Belfast News Letter, July 3, 1986.

82

by the same ideological forces that influenced others in the Protestant community. Considering
that idea, sectarianism was surely an influence for some in the RUC, and collusion between the
RUC and Protestant paramilitaries must be considered. On November 11, 1982 the police shot
three republicans. Within a month four other Catholics, most likely republicans, were also shot,
three of whom died. In all of these instances no weapons or proof of illegal behavior were
discovered. It appeared as though the RUC was indiscriminately gunning down Catholics. The
controversy sparked by these events is commonly referred to in terms of the possibility of an
RUC “shoot to kill policy.” After an independent investigation, it was decided that there was not
substantial evidence to support the existence of such a policy, 52 but what is important is that
sectarian influences could have certainly played a part in the actions of individual officers.
Continuing this line, at official levels, Protestant paramilitaries were undoubtedly pursued by law
enforcement and prosecuted similarly to their Catholic counterparts, but instances of varying
degrees of collusion were certain on local levels. Briefly, informal connections existed between
security-forces and paramilitary members. These connections ranged from the passing of
information or possibly weapons from individual RUC men to paramilitary activists. Such
behavior represents what Steve Bruce calls instances of “indifference” shared by some RUC
officers pertaining to singular acts of violence. 53 Furthermore, in a roughly construed statistical
proposition, it has been concluded that one out of one hundred Northern Ireland citizens have
participated in the planning and execution of at least one violent act—participation ranging from
committing an act a violent to passing information or materials to those who will participate in
the act. 54 The point here is not to hint at a possible conspiracy between law enforcement and
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Protestant paramilitaries; rather, it is to to identify the complex relationship that existed between
an individual’s official, public duty and their private political ideologies, which is relevant here
because by the mid-1980s the majority of the Protestants had adopted loyalist attitudes, and thus
individuals were more willing to engage in some form of violence, whether aimed at physical
harm or otherwise.

Conclusion
The Anglo-Irish era, and the wake created by Sinn Féin’s entrance into politics following
the hunger strike of 1981 emphasized a number of themes relevant to Protestant political
attitudes and reaction. The first, and most general, is that the division between paramilitary
interests and elite politicians had drastically widened, and there were no major attempts to
recreate the unity of the post Sunningdale period in 1974, even after the signing of the AngloIrish Agreement. Secondly, there was a clear dispute and confusion over how to implement
protest against the Agreement. Again, there was a stark difference between official, mainstream
Protestant responses and those of the paramilitaries. The initial reaction of the Protestant political
leadership was the unoriginal but tried and tested method of merely saying “no.” The primary
methods employed during the campaign of negative Protestant response were public street
protests, localized acts of civil disobedience, and the threat of organized violence. After many
years the loyalist battle of attrition, though ineffective in its immediacy, in the end had the effect
because they represented a more unofficial, but certainly still ideologically motivated entity within the male
dominated paramilitary world. Protestant women were a small percentage of the official membership of paramilitary
organizations, and likewise their activity was often secondary regarding acts of political violence. Women
commonly transported and stored materials, such as weapons, ammunition, and explosives, passed information, and
cleaned locations after a murder was committed, Sandra McEvoy, “Loyalist Women Paramilitaries in Northern
Ireland: Beginning a Feminist Conversation about Conflict Resolution,” Security Studies 18, no. 2 (2009): 269-70.
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of causing both British and Irish politicians to realize that Protestant involvement in any future
Northern Ireland settlement was going to have to be a necessity, despite their current lack of
political creativity. 55 After the Agreement paramilitaries also seemed to respond typically, with
an increase in fatal violence. However, the period after the Anglo-Irish Agreement saw greater
innovation coming from the paramilitary camp, embodied by the publication of Common Sense.
But considering all levels of rhetoric and action on the part of both elite politicians and
grassroots paramilitary activists, what becomes clear is that throughout the 1980s, and certainly
after the 1985 singing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, Protestants felt completely stripped of all
legitimate institutional political participation and acknowledgment within the six county
Northern Ireland state, a conceptual and geographic entity held to be the Protestant birthright and
guarantor of Protestant autonomy on the island of Ireland.
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Conclusion
Referring to the period following the signing of the Good Friday, or Belfast Peace
Agreement in 1998, Henry Patterson and Eric Kauffman claim, “Unionism’s rebel alter-ego has
moved into the driver’s seat” of Protestant political life. 1 However, this essay proposes that the
processes by which “rebel Unionism,” or loyalism, became the more prominent ideological
viewpoint for Protestant Northern Ireland arose in the late 1960s, when the population first
became deeply dissatisfied by the unionism of figures like Terence O’Neill; a unionism which
threatened the foundations of Protestant local autonomy. Further fueled by an intense IRA
campaign, beginning in the early 1970s, many Protestants began to accept that violence may be
their best recourse to protect both the safety of their communities, and the constitutional position
of Northern Ireland. Likewise, politicians such as Ian Paisley and William Craig began to court
paramilitary support in order to further their own political goals. This brief courtship ended after
the UWC strike of 1974, leading to a rift between elite political loyalists and their grassroots
paramilitary counterparts. However, it was clear that the pillars of loyalism—with its combative
and distrusting attitudes towards the Catholic community and their political masters in
Westminster—became naturalized into the social fabric of the Protestant community, and an
institutionalized form of mainstream political discourse by the late 1970s. Such trends had
lasting effects on the development of the Troubles during and indeed after the era of the AngloIrish Agreement, when the IRA had successfully embarked on a strategy that combined its
campaign of violence with formalized political participation through its political wing, Sinn Féin.
Beginning with O’Neill’s moderating policies and ending with the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, over the near thirty year period covered by this study it has been made clear that the
1
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story for Ulster Protestants was one of loss through forced compromise. 2 Many Protestants began
to see themselves as the oppressed minority in a political landscape shaped by an indifferent UK
government, a wanting Irish Republic, and a murderous IRA campaign. The response for many
Protestants was to become bitterly and violently entrenched within their traditional symbolic and
geographic bastions; namely their ideology of ethno-nationalistic Orangeism and its traditional
boon to the Northern Ireland state’s pro-Protestant functioning, the legitimacy of which were
seen as constantly under threat. Within these rigid social and political practices, which were
further defined by economic circumstance, loyalism was pervasively adopted by the majority of
the Protestant community due to its attachment to the institutions of state and its cultural
manifestations. Loyalism was thus an ideology informed by various modes of sectarian
assertiveness, including the religiously fervent evangelicalism of County Antrim and Armagh’s
weary border anxiety. Furthermore, the practice of loyalism was “treated as a sign of honesty” 3
within the Ulster Protestant community. Perceived betrayers of that honesty pressed the many
cleavages and confusions within loyalism, and though Steve Bruce’s bifurcation between the
“evangelical” and paramilitary “gunmen” strains of loyalism is certainly informative to address
these divisions, it is somewhat incomplete for this analysis because, apart from the purely
ideological, the early Troubles were characterized by rampant and unpredictable violence, a
material force that massively fractured an individual’s social and political outlook.
Outside of socioeconomic class and its geographic imperatives, the place of violence in
Northern Ireland’s politics was the single largest determining factor regarding the growth of
loyalism as a form of political expression. Politicians and paramilitaries alike exercised violence
on literal and abstract levels in order to exert political power; power in this sense meaning an
2
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extra-state form of coercion. 4 Paramilitary violence is more obviously construed; however,
politicians also engaged in coercive forms of violence through their formal relationships with
paramilitaries, but also through the threat of violent recourse if their goals weren’t reached. Ian
Paisley’s invoking of the Third Force or William Craig’s accompaniment of unarmed, uniformed
UDA men in the early 1970s neatly exemplifies the implied violence exhibited by loyalist
political leaders. Nonetheless, as widespread violence and indeed the acceptance of it began to
wane in the late 1970s, the divide between Protestant politicians, paramilitary activists, and their
communities greatly widened. Also due to this division the historiography of Ulster Protestant
political division blurs. Many accounts, due to their extensive reliance on formal political
records, such as the UUP papers and other official documentation, 5 have tended to portray
grassroots populism as a segment of Protestant Northern Ireland who could be accurately
portrayed as an extension of their political representatives, and though there is some merit to this
sort of analysis, it is also misleading to any understanding of Protestant grassroots activism.
Paramilitary political goals, though still tied to the constitutional legitimacy of Northern Ireland,
shifted dynamically away from the reactionary refrain “Ulster Says No.”
The origins of what this study contends to be grassroots Protestant politics have been
discussed primarily in their relationship to paramilitary members’ experiences in the prison
system of Northern Ireland and how those experiences affected their families’ and associated
communities. That point deserves to be echoed, especially regarding the Troubles as they
unfolded throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. In an extensive survey of loyalist
4
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paramilitary prisoners, Colin Crawford reports that almost seventy-five percent of respondents
reported becoming more politicized after their time spent in prison, meaning they were more
willing to express their political goals through, at least to some degree, non-violent means. The
UVF’s Progressive Unionist Party and the formation of the UDA’s Ulster Democratic Party
helped, in concert with former and current Protestant paramilitaries, in the formation of the
Combined Loyalist Military Command—a group whose discussions eventually led to the
announcement of a loyalist ceasefire on October 13, 1994, two months after the IRA made a
similar declaration. The ever-fragile paramilitary ceasefires was the crucible of the present peace
process. It also must be stressed that violence by no means disappeared from the political
landscape. The 1990s saw a huge increase in Protestant paramilitary action compared to the
1980s. In fact, 1993, 1994, and 1997, were the only years—preceding the signing of the Good
Friday, Belfast Peace Agreement—in which Protestant paramilitaries claimed more victims than
their Catholic counterparts. 6
Outside of purely violent responses it is no accident that paramilitaries on both sides of
the sectarian divide were responsible for some of the most innovative political activity of the
Troubles. After all it was paramilitary activists and their working class communities that
witnessed the brunt of Troubles related violence and material deprivation. It is also no
coincidence that of the few high-profile political assassinations that republicanism claimed, a
large proportion of them were prominent within paramilitary circles for not only their military
roles, but also for their political action. In January 1982, Red Hand Commando (a small but very
violent paramilitary force that was connected the UVF) founder and prominent Belfast politician,
6
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John McKeague, was shot dead by the Irish National Liberation Army inside his stationary shop
in East Belfast. In his later years McKeague distanced himself from his paramilitary role and
reached out to Catholic politicians and republicans in hopes of bridging the gap between the two
communities, with no success. John McMichael, deputy leader of the UDA and architect of
Common Sense, was killed when a booby-trap bomb exploded underneath his car on December
22, 1987. 7
The reasons for the killing of McKeague and McMichael are surely debatable, but there
are a few speculative points that should be made, especially when considered against the great
absence of republican assassinations of mainstream political figures. The first point that can be
made is a matter of material circumstance. Many politicians lived outside the reach of republican
action and indeed enjoyed greater security measures, whereas both McKeague and McMichael
lived in close proximity to working class areas of Belfast, the main area of operation for
paramilitaries, Catholic and Protestant alike. In more ideological terms, through their attempts to
construct inter-ethnic relations within the constitutional arrangements of Northern Ireland, the
political actions of McKeague and McMichael served to severely undermine the primary
republican goal of a united Ireland. On the other hand, figures like Paisley were ironically
positive forces for republicans who wished to portray Protestant Northern Ireland as politically
inarticulate reactionaries who would never compromise with a minority it had historically
oppressed. In the end, however, for reasons already highlighted throughout this study, working
class paramilitary politics never caught on because of their associated proximity to violence,
despite a willingness to engage in constructive cross community, class-based politics. Suspicions
within the Protestant working class itself surrounding any possible association with republicans
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was another major obstacle facing the legitimacy of Protestant paramilitary politics. 8 Such rigid
political stances are still prevalent in Northern Ireland today, where the Protestant DUP and
Catholic Sinn Féin are the two largest political parties representing their respective communities.
A recent UDA press statement read, “Rest assured the UDA are still in existence and won't be
leaving… whilst republicans of any faction still exist.” 9 The implication is clear: violence will be
met with violence. More pessimistically perhaps is the fact that this statement suggests that there
is no foreseeable end to the conflict as long as historical, ethno-political goals are still so deeply
disputed.
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